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Abstract 
 
Climate change will be most apparent in alterations to the hydrologic system—
shifts in movement, variations in extremes—thereby defining many resource disputes in 
the coming decades. Water is a boundaryless resource; as its hydrologic patterns shift 
within and without borders, so too will preexisting agreements on its use and allocation. 
The question for transboundary water agreements is: how can agreements both satisfy 
parties’ needs and account for future uncertainties of climate-induced changes to their 
basins’ hydrologic systems? 
From examining literature and water agreements, this thesis develops a list of 
provisions identified as foundational to resiliency in transboundary water agreements. 
The context of Central Asia provides a case study for determining the effectiveness of 
provisions in fostering resiliency, ultimately concluding that, if the implementation of an 
agreement is weak, then the impact of provisions is negated. The value of an agreement‘s 
content is secondary to the resilient action resulting from it. Future research is needed to 
understand how provisions can be used to promote or strengthen agreement 
implementation.  
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Section One 
 
“Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce anything; 
Scarce anything can be had in exchange for it.” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As climate change forces shifts from historic hydrologic patterns, the question of 
resiliency within preexisting water agreements echoes in the nexus of water and conflict. 
There is a strong argument for creating provisions that withstand the impacts and 
changes, foreseen and unforeseen, within transboundary river agreements. How can 
agreements both satisfy parties' current needs and account for future uncertainties? Can 
provisions within an agreement be a solution for mitigating international conflict caused 
by climate change? The hypothesis and theory of change of this thesis is that if riparians 
have mechanisms, or provisions, for adaptation within the overarching agreement 
framework, then transboundary river agreements will have the resiliency to withstand the 
impacts of climate change. The research presented below considers water and conflict, 
water and cooperation, and water and climate change in order to extract from the 
literature a list of provisions identified as important to resiliency in water agreements. 
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The list of provisions is then applied to two Central Asian water treaties for empirical 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the provisions. Finally, a discussion of the findings 
articulates the implied conditionality of implementation for provisions to have an impact 
on resiliency.  
 
Background  
 
Rivers are the scoliotic backbone of life. Watercourses carry the minerals and 
microorganisms critical to healthy ecological systems, while bending geography to the 
demands of force and gravity. Fertile river valleys accelerated the evolution and 
interdependence of flora and fauna. Humans then leveraged basin conditions for hunting 
and later agriculture, flourishing as a species to create cultures, societies, and 
technologies that have since defined the great civilizations—such as Mesopotamia in the 
Fertile Crescent, the Nile cities of Cairo and Alexandria, the canal-dependent 
metropolitan of London, and even the modern cities of the American West. 
Though carrying less than 0.3% of the world’s freshwater supply, rivers have 
influenced humankind more so than any other water source. Culturally, rivers define 
religion, festivals, and even language. Consider the Ganges, India’s mystic river and 
home to the goddess Ganga, or the Jordan, the river of Christ’s baptism and start of his 
evangelism. Economically, rivers have served as a link between peoples. Trade along 
rivers began as early as 3000 BC in Mesopotamia, building bridges between different 
civilizations and creating networks for the exchange of goods and knowledge (Whipps, 
2008). Rivers provided the highways for exploration, opening the great continental 
expanses of North America for French traders in fur-laden canoes and the heart of Africa 
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for David Livingstone. As Henry Thoreau wrote, “[Rivers] are the constant lure, when 
they flow by our doors, to distant enterprise and adventure, and, by a natural impulse, the 
dwellers on their banks will at length accompany their currents to the lowlands of the 
globe, or explore at their invitation the interior of continents” (Thoreau, 2012, 92). 
Considering the role of rivers in both the creation and connection of civilizations, 
it is of little surprise that watercourses have defined international relationships throughout 
the past seven thousand years. The first known international treaty of any kind was a 
water treaty in 2500 BC between two Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma to end a 
dispute along the Tigris River (UN, 2014). In the 4500 years since, thousands of water 
treaties have been implemented in cases of disputes—the Food and Agricultural 
Organization estimates over 3600 water treaties since 805 AD (FAO, qtd. In UN, 2014). 
More than 150 of these treaties have been signed in the last fifty years alone (UN, 2014). 
Of course, water treaties have developed out of a necessity for cooperation: the world has 
263 transboundary basins falling within 145 nations, and 21 of those nations lay 
exclusively within shared basins (UN, 2014).  
Yet, for how central watercourses have been to human development, our mastery 
over rivers remains as tumultuous as their characteristic waters. Water is legally defined 
as a fugitive resource, meaning that it lacks a fixed location and must be captured to be 
used. It heeds no boundaries without a stern and engineered hand. As such, we have 
diverted, dyked, dammed, and damned rivers to control water. Enduring civilizations, like 
Mesopotamia, China, and industrial Europe, responded to water challenges by redefining 
water management through innovative systems, whereas societies unable to create, 
maintain, and/or grow waterworks declined and collapsed. As one author summarized: 
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“…the economic productiveness and political equilibrium of today’s 
advanced societies depends critically upon the robustness, security, and 
continuous innovative development of an interlinked array of giant dams, 
electric power plants, aqueducts, reservoirs, pumps, distribution pipes, 
sanitary sewage systems, wastewater treatment facilities, irrigation canals, 
drainage systems, and levees...” (Solomon, 2010, 368) 
 
In other words, it was through highly-refined and engineered infrastructure that societies 
established mastery of rivers. The technologies of control created short-term stability—
but was it in exchange for long-term climate instability?  
 This micro-managerial control has a cost. Consider the Aral Sea, for example, the 
USSR’s “hydraulic Chernobyl” (Solomon, 2010, 377). The Soviet effort to transform the 
steppes into a cotton-producing belt was blasé reengineering of an arid ecosystem. By 
diverting the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (known as the Jaxartes and Oxus of ancient 
history), the Soviets reduced the world’s fourth-largest freshwater lake into two small, 
saline lakes. Today, the steppes face a return to their aridity: the exposed lakebed creates 
a salty dust bowl effect on the cotton fields, while the stunted hydrological system makes 
for hotter summers and colder winters with less rainfall, less snowpack, and less runoff 
into the rivers. The result is a seemingly irreversible climate change. 
Climate change brings us to the sham of humanity’s so-called mastery of rivers, in 
that our advancements took for granted water’s renewability. An IUCN report phrased 
the concept as “an assumption of ecosystem stationarity,” meaning that water 
management was designed on the historical record of a basin’s hydrologic system 
(Barchiesi et al., 2014, 11). Civilizations aborted river outflow without questing the 
continuation of inflow. We established cities—giant cities, like Los Angeles and 
Mumbai—on the final drops of imported rivers. And we know now that our assurances 
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were unsustainable, as the means to mastery was also its undoing: it limited adaptability 
and exacerbated climate change. First, increasing the technical control over natural 
systems limited societies’ adaptability—dams built to provide water in the dry season 
ballooned nearby populations accordingly; in-house taps created endless flows of 
freshwater; subsidized and expanding irrigation networks slowly unsynced demand to 
natural supply. Second, the very technologies that provided the power for control, like the 
coal that produced energy and the toxic byproducts of infrastructure development, were 
the technologies that enabled climate change.  
The impacts of climate change will be evident in multiple arenas, such as the 
well-publicized threat to polar bears and the increased frequency of “100 Year” storms. 
However, few natural systems will be impacted as significantly as the hydrologic cycle. 
Climate change is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as “a 
statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its 
variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer),” which “may 
be due in natural processes or external forces or to persistent anthropogenic changes in 
the composition of the atmosphere or in land use” (IPCC, 2001, qtd. in Barchiesi et al., 
2014). For rivers, these persistent changes will be felt from source to termination. As 
pictured in Image 1.1, the amount of river water, or flow, will be impacted by increased 
glacier melt, as well as shifts to rainfall instead of snow, which will change the 
seasonality of high flows and low flows. Precipitation changes will also increase erosion, 
siltation, and landslides, while temperature changes increase evaporation from water 
bodies. For industries and cities built within the historical basin conditions, changes will 
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have direct impacts on their livelihoods, and will be further exacerbated by impacts felt in 
aquifers and wetlands.  
Image 1.1. Climate Change in a Typical River Basin (Barchiesi et al., 2014, 12)  
 
 Recent decades have brought awareness of the human impact on climate and 
ecosystems, and especially the vulnerability of freshwater systems. Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment experts predict that 25% of freshwater supply may already be 
unsustainably consumed. This stress will worsen in coming years, as seen in Image 1.2 
below. Chronic shortages cannot be fixed by moving heavy loads of water, but must be 
addressed watershed by watershed—yet must also satisfy the political nature of the 
world’s 261 transnational river basins (Solomon, 2010, 376). Borders, populations, 
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historical use, and preexisting agreements all contribute to the politicization of 
watersheds.  
Image 1.2. Water Stress by Country (World Resources Institute)  
 
 
Consider again the Aral Sea crisis. Despite multiple layers of international, 
interstate, and national agreements and commitments to reverse the desiccation of the 
basin, the Aral Sea continues to shrink. The water management and regional governance 
has failed the environment and the social interdependence of the basin, as well as the long 
term climatic implications. In other words, the current governing agreements have failed 
both short- and long-term. The question, then, is not merely how to govern a watershed, 
nor how to address the impacts of climate change. Rather, the question is how to create 
agreements that can satisfy the needs of parties today, while also considering the future 
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uncertainties of climate-induced changes to basins’ hydrological systems. And, 
underscoring this orientation is the question of how to ensure resiliency in the agreement, 
so that it can withstand the pressures of climate change and promote cooperation between 
riparians.  
 
Resiliency and Water Agreements  
 
The future of water disputes has been heralded as an apocalyptic certainty in 
media, entertainment, and even academic outlets. Ismail Serageldin, former chairman of 
the World Commission for Water, said in 1995: “Many of the wars in this century were 
about oil, but those of the next century will be over water.” Examples of water tensions 
are seen in violent outbreaks around the world—Karachi, Pakistan; Cochabamba, 
Bolivia; and Kenya, in what one author calls “the oddest report of water violence” 
between monkeys and humans, in a conflict over water tankers that left eight primates 
dead (Solomon, 2010, 371-372).  
Yet, when stepping away from the fervor of fear, water war is impractical. It has 
been, and continues to be, rare. Wolf (2003) found that 67.1% of riparian interactions are 
cooperative, 27.7% of riparian interactions are neutral, and a mere 5.2% of riparian 
interactions are conflictive. Similarly, though using different methodology, Kalbhenn and 
Bernauer (2012) found that a mere 18.3% of interactions are conflictive.1 The nature of 
water agreements seemingly rebuffs militarized escalation.  
                                                     
1 Both datasets include verbal hostilities as conflictive interactions. 
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Jeuland (2017) wrote that “[t]here is ample evidence that river basin treaties are 
remarkable in their resilience, even in some of the world’s most contentious locations, 
providing effective mechanisms to resolve disputes.” The Indus River Commission has 
survived two wars; the Mekong River Exchange continued technical meetings through 
the Vietnam War; and Central Asia’s Cooperation on Transboundary Water Management 
has lasted through several post-Soviet revolutions and coups. Water agreements have 
been, overall, resilient. So, what is resiliency?  
The theory of resiliency comes from the field of psychology, stemming from the 
work of Emmy Werner in the 1970s and 80s. Werner worked with at-risk children, and 
found that one-third did not exhibit the destructive behaviors of their peers or parents, 
such as teenage pregnancies and substance abuse (Werner, 1982). Werner named this 
group “resilient.” Resiliency theory focuses on positive capabilities, the “contextual, 
social, and individual variables”, that disrupt negative trajectories towards risky 
behaviors (Zimmerman, 2013). It emphasizes coping mechanisms amidst difficulties.  
The application of resiliency theory to water treaties acknowledges the strength-
based foundation of resiliency. Werner’s “resilient” children exhibited actions, both 
internal and external, that disrupted the path towards unhealthy, conflictive, and risky 
behaviors. Transferring the theory to agreements, then, requires examination of the 
actions, both internal and external, that an agreement can promote to disrupt the 
trajectory towards failed implementation. Wolf (2007) and Brochmann (2012) found that 
resiliency is tied to cooperative behavior elicited by a water treaty. Therefore, there is a 
braided theme to extract regarding water agreements and resiliency: resiliency reduces 
the likelihood of negative behavior; resiliency stems from cooperation in a watershed; 
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and cooperation comes from a successful water agreement. In other words, resiliency is 
tied to positive riparian relations and agreement implementation.  
But why pursue resiliency? Why not mere flexibility or sustainability? Although 
the latter concepts are important traits within a resilient agreement, resiliency is a 
worthwhile goal because of its broader encompassment of definitions. Resiliency theory 
articulates the ability to “respond and recover” (Table 1.1 below) and even “thrive” 
(Table 1.1) in times of crisis. Flexibility and sustainability are much narrower in scope, 
implying the capabilities necessary to adapt, but not necessarily the capabilities to 
flourish. In contrast, resiliency is an optimistic, positive, and forward-moving goal for 
nations and communities to adopt. In the words of writer James Cascio, “Sustainability is 
about survival. The goal of resilience is to thrive” (Cascio, n.d.). 
Table 1.1: Selected Definitions of Community resiliency (Source: Crow, 2018) 
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 The question stemming from resiliency theory, then, and the discussion of 
resiliency within a community, an agreement, or climate change, is: what are the aspects 
of an agreement that promote resiliency? And how can those be capitalized upon to 
strengthen conflict prevention in a future of heightened water shortages, stemming from 
climate change?  
 
Climate Change and Responses in Water Agreements  
 
 To understand how to promote resiliency in treaties, it is necessary to understand 
what threatens to inhibit current water agreements. Climate change is a real and sizeable 
threat. A growing body of scientific models and evidence provide blurry outlines of 
clouded uncertainty, yet reinforce the changes that will, and have begun, to take place. 
We do not know how it will reshape civilization’s relationship with rivers, though we 
know it will. And as it modifies the hydrologic system, preexisting water agreements 
must modify accordingly.  
Solomon (2010) argues that society has not modified water use to climate change 
pressures. He writes that modern societies tend to take one of four options to respond to 
the looming impacts of climate change. The first option is to do nothing and wait until a 
solution is found, such as genetically modified crops or gradual population reduction. The 
second option is to be more efficient with water use through regulation or market-
oriented methods. Already, this option has begun to be implemented in many places out 
of necessity, such as in Israel where water scarcity has been monetized by an innovative 
water industry. The third option is to divert huge amounts of water from wetlands to 
drying lands. The final option is to drill deep into the Earth’s reserves and pump them 
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dry. The Ogallala Aquifer in the heartland of the U.S. is an example of draining 
underground water reserves for contemporary prioritization of consumption.  
In coincidental response to Solomon, Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identify 
four strategies for addressing climate change within agreements. The first strategy is 
dubbed “ignoring uncertainty,” meaning the deliberate or unconscious denial of 
uncertainty. The authors use the example of omitting a conflict resolution process from a 
water treaty as a way of ignoring the risk of conflict (2014, 53). It is of little surprise that 
this strategy, which echoes the warnings of Solomon above, is best avoided. The second 
strategy, called the “complete contracts approach,” tries to create certainty in all 
situations. This tongue-in-cheek “watertight agreement” removes any ambiguity (2014, 
54). However, the rigidity of such a strategy inhibits flexibility when unforeseen 
scenarios happen. The third strategy reduces the impacts of climate change by limiting 
uncertainty. Actions such as transparent data, climate modelling, and engineering projects 
are methods of mitigating future effects. On the continuum of successful strategies, 
Drieschova and Eckstein rank this above the former option, yet caution against the 
assumption that reducing uncertainty eliminates uncertainty (2014, 54). The fourth and 
favorite strategy of Drieschova and Eckstein is called the “open-ended approach” (2014, 
55). This strategy responds to climate change uncertainty by designing flexibility into 
water management. Examples here include mutual assistance funds, indirect water 
allocation, and feedback loops for design and operation (ibid). One of the strongest 
advantages of the flexible approach is that riparians can adapt obligations to their shifting 
natural restraints or advantages.  
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It is plain that Solomon’s four options, and at least two of Drieschova and 
Eckstein’s options, lack sustainability and even short-term feasibility. Solomon argued 
that the answer to addressing the pressure of water scarcity is a paradigm shift, in which 
water is seen as the new oil – “a precious resource that has to be consciously conserved, 
efficiently used, and properly accounted for on the balance sheets across the breadth of 
human activity, great and mundane” (Solomon, 2010, 383).  
Both Solomon and Drieschova and Eckstein recognize that there is a need for 
greater resiliency in and strengthening of water agreements. Agreements must modify to 
the pressures of climate change. It is through this lens of modification that the concept of 
provisions, or mechanisms within an agreement for particular eventualities, comes to the 
forefront of relevant literature.  
 
Introduction to Agreements  
 
 The concept of provisions hinges upon the foundations of agreements. The basic 
principles of agreements create the foundation for discussing what additional scaffolding, 
such as provisions, can be added to a water agreement. Though critically important in the 
nexus of water and conflict, water agreements are—at their core—founded on the same 
principles of any other agreement: interests and needs. Agreements are ratified when the 
positions, interests, and/or needs of parties are satisfied to the degree where peace is 
preferable to conflict. Often veiled behind positionality and its temerarious rhetoric are 
parties' motivations, their needs and interests, which make for the substance of 
meaningful negotiations. The classic example of sisters arguing over an orange illustrates 
the purpose of understanding interests: two siblings fighting over an orange results in 
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their mother cutting it in half; one sister goes outside to eat the flesh, while the other 
sister goes to the kitchen to zest the skin for a cake (Follett, 1995). Of course, had they 
discussed their motivations for wanting the orange, each sister could have been fully 
satisfied. Similarly, finding resolutions for complex disputes, such as a water conflict, is 
still a matter of satisfying interests. Two riparians fighting over water may appear 
unresolvable until examining interests reveals maneuverability. Exploring interests 
allows parties to craft win-win solutions.  
 There are three overarching categories of interests: substantive, procedural, and 
psychological (Moore, 2003, p. 75). Substantive interests are comprised of goods, such as 
money, time, or natural resources like water and oil. Procedural interests are the 
mechanisms through which the dispute is discussed and outcomes are implemented. 
Agreeing to use the World Bank as a neutral mediator, or creating a path for resolving 
future disputes, are procedural interests. Finally, psychological interests are emotional 
and relational needs. In a transboundary context, the need for political face-saving, or for 
trust in an upstream riparian, are psychological interests.  
 The combination of substantive, procedural, and psychological interests comprise 
the reasons a party agrees to a treaty. When interests are satisfied, parties are satisfied. 
Interests can also be considered in long-term ways. By modifying traditional agreements 
to address future interests—whether procedural, substantive, or psychological—the 
agreement is better equipped for climate change. It will also be more resilient, as the 
agreement will be able to withstand, and even thrive in, crises.  
 Mechanisms for adaptation, eventualities, and flexibility within agreements are 
not uncommon; in fact, provisions are present in as many as three-quarters of 
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transboundary water treaties (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). The following section will examine 
the context of and arguments for provisions and mechanisms, before returning to the 
foundation of interests and needs, established above, in the creation of a provision list.  
 
Literature on Provisions in Water Agreements 
 
There is a broad body of literature on the existence and promotion of provisions 
within transboundary water treaties. The underlying theory is that provisions can, if done 
correctly, impact the treaty’s capacity for withstanding conflict. As Tir and Stinnett write: 
“The central hypothesis is that the more institutional features [provisions] a treaty 
contains, the more effective it will be in preventing the occurrence of militarized conflicts 
between signatory states” (2012, 218). The theory is further expanded in this thesis, to 
propose that provisions can impact the treaty’s resiliency in withstanding negative 
trajectories.  
A provision is defined as “the action of providing or supplying something for 
use,” specifically “for future eventualities or requirements” (Google Dictionary). Its Latin 
origin, providere, means to foresee or to attend to. Both are action-oriented verbs with 
positive connotations. The optimism connoted from the idea of provisions syncs with the 
cooperation and collaboration necessary in transboundary agreements, both in conception 
and in implementation. In other words, the very roots of provisions imply the hope of 
resiliency. For this reason, the term provision is used over semi-synonymous terms, like 
“rules” (Drieschova and Eckstein) or “criteria” (d'Estrée and Colby), employed in other 
contexts.  
16 
 
 
Several authors have written extensively in the literature on treaty provisions. 
Their works, discussed in brief below and expanded upon in topical discussions later in 
this section, have been defining pieces in compiling a master list of treaty provisions. Tir 
and Stinnett (2012) found that water scarcity increases the chance of militarized conflict, 
but that “highly institutionalized river agreements” create cooperative riparian 
interactions and reduce militarized interstate disputes by 71% (2012, 212, 221). The 
authors defined institutionalization by four provisions—monitoring, conflict 
management, enforcement provisions, and intergovernmental organizations—and purport 
all four provisions to be important in an agreement’s ability to withstand climate change. 
Ultimately, the authors found that 72% of the treaties examined in their empirical 
research had at least one institutional provision — 47% included monitoring provisions, 
7% had enforcement provisions, 35% had conflict management provisions, and 35% 
delegated authority to an international institution (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 216). Though 
far from comprehensive provision coverage, the findings are encouraging, and provide a 
basis for determining whether provisions are effective or merely prevalent.  
 A World Bank report by Dinar et al. (2016) identified similar findings in their 
literature review of water treaty resiliency. They cited the findings of Dinar et al. (2015), 
which underscored the importance of Tir and Stinnett’s four provisions, and further found 
that flexibility and directness in water allocation are important to agreement stability. 
Dinar et al. (2016) also identified the findings of Mitchell and Zawahri (2015), which 
suggested that the exchange of data and an enforcement provision both reduced the 
likelihood of military encounters and increased the likelihood that negotiations would be 
successful in resolving the conflict.  
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In a similar vein, Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identified a list of cooperative 
transboundary mechanisms. Their motivation is to use provisions “to establish an 
internationally more benign environment that is conducive to cooperation and mutual 
burden sharing” (2014, 52). Drieschova and Eckstein distinguish between substantive and 
procedural “rules” [provisions]. Two of their identified rules overlap with Tir and 
Stinnett, monitoring and dispute resolution, and with Mitchell and Zawahri (2015), 
transparent data sharing, but the majority of Dreischova and Eckstein’s provisions are 
distinct. These include technical and financial cooperation, prior notice and consultation, 
flexibility mechanisms, amendment mechanisms, allocation methods, and prioritization 
of use.  
Green et al. (2013) similarly promote seven elements necessary for “institutional 
and ecological resilience” in their research on the Okavango River Basin. They argue that 
natural resource management accompanies “a cycle of experimenting, monitoring, 
learning, and adapting” (2013, 1), and that a successful water agreement includes a 
variety of mechanisms for enabling resiliency through cooperation and adaptation. Green 
et al. (2013) highlight the importance of water allocation methods, provisions for extreme 
events, and joint management commissions, while also joining the academic chorus 
promoting enforcement, dispute resolution, and joint monitoring and information 
exchanges. Green et al. also underscore the significance of horizontal and vertical flows 
of information and coordination, adaptive management, public participation, and the 
authority to respond to changing circumstances.  
d'Estrée and Colby (2004) use a framework for evaluating success in water 
conflict resolution, of which some aspects reiterate—or at least enlighten—provisions for 
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a water agreement. Criteria for evaluating success include cost effective implementation 
and financial feasibility of an agreement, environmental sustainability, compliance and 
incentives for compliance, flexibility, and the ability to resolve future disputes (2004). 
Though the criteria extracted are for measuring the success of an agreement, instead of 
for conjecturing the success of an agreement, there is illumination for creating provisions 
from the posthumous identification of success in an agreement.  
Troell and Swanson (2014, 26) identified provisions that address the multi-
sectoral challenges of water stresses. Changes to the hydrologic cycle will indirectly 
shape other potential areas of conflict, both related and unrelated to water—ranging from 
agriculture and biodiversity to urbanization and world markets. The implication here is 
that climate changes to the water cycle will have drastic felt impacts across the social and 
environmental spectrum, exacerbating existing and latent conflicts. Troell and Swanson 
propose four methods for adaptive water management (2014, 31). The first is the creation 
or emphasis of policies, practices, and institutional mechanisms [provisions] for 
flexibility and facilitating knowledge sharing. The second is multilevel governance, and 
the third is the inclusion of stakeholders in the full process of management. The fourth is 
using an ecosystem-based approach to ensure environmental flows and resiliency. These 
provisions identify flexibility, vertical and horizontal integration, and the environment as 
essential considerations to include in treaties.  
 Finally, a UNDP report overviewing transboundary water agreements found seven 
topical themes across 145 agreements [see Image 1.3 below] (Human Development 
Report, 2006). Though not specific to the creation of provisions, the report provides a 
sense of the priorities of most riparians, which illumines the provisions most relevant to 
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most agreements. More than three quarters of agreements focused on hydropower (39%) 
and water utilization (37%). Far less frequent were sections on flood control (9%), 
industry allocation (6%), navigation (4%), and pollution (4%). Only one of the 145 
surveyed agreements addressed fishing. As provisions are examined and extracted, it is 
important to frame them in light of their relevance to the majority of water agreements.  
Image 1.3. Sectorial Distribution of 145 Agreements on Transboundary Water Resources (Human 
Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. UNDP, 2006) 
 
 
In examining the literature on provisions, three major themes were repeated 
throughout. First, there is significant overlap of identified provisions between authors. 
This not only suggests that the provision is worthwhile and important to include, but that 
its inclusion is broadly supported in the academic community. Second, though few 
authors specifically identified the theory of resiliency as an important foundation, most 
authors used words like adaptation, flexibility, sustainability, and stability in justifying 
the purpose of provisions. This suggests that the purpose of provisions is largely the 
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same; provisions are designed from the motivation to prevent conflict and encourage 
cooperation. Finally, the literature on provisions emphasized, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, the importance of content in an agreement. There is very little discussion on 
issues of implementation. As will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis, the 
overemphasis on content may be exaggerating the weight that provisions actually hold in 
a treaty’s resiliency to climate change, and even conflict in general.  
 The literature detailed above was foundational in articulating what provisions 
look like. The following subsections better describe the nature of the provisions 
identified, and further detail their application to water agreements.  
 
Intergovernmental Institutions  
 
One of the most common provisions in established water agreements are 
intergovernmental institutions, also called commissions or interstate organizations. Tir 
and Stinnett (2012) found that where there are transboundary institutions, the likelihood 
of militarized conflict between riparians is reduced. Institutions established within 
treaties can address how rivers will be used and allocated, and how water quality, water 
levels, and navigation will be respected, because the institution facilitates diplomacy, 
communication, and cooperation (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 217). The distinct nature of 
delegated authorities also keeps issues from becoming political, as it frames problems as 
technical and methodological issues to be resolved through logic and science.  
Green et al. (2013) promote joint management for similar reasons. Commissions 
function outside the “diplomatic restraints” of the political community, as technocrats 
from each state can collaboratively problem solve issues related to management, 
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conservation, and allocation, without the burden of politics. Green et al. recommend a 
provision for joint management that integrates all related issues to a basin into the 
authority of one overarching body, with the proper authority to respond to crises. They 
argue that this is required for efficient governance over a basin, writing: “Otherwise, the 
system is well informed but impotent” (2013, 5).  
Considering Tir and Stinnett and Green et. al’s promotion of an intergovernmental 
body, Intergovernmental Institution is the first identified provision to be included in the 
provision list. This provision recommends designating an intergovernmental institution 
with self-governance and minimal political oversight, thereby reducing political volatility 
and ensuring long-term consistency in the management of a shared basin.  
 
Reframing the Value of Water  
 
Tir and Stinnett (2012) argue that the value of water will increase, especially 
psychologically, as climate change impacts are felt at a basin level. Perceived value of 
water is directly tied to conflict over water. Water’s value increases the risk of conflict in 
four ways. First, the increased value of water will heighten actual tensions and the 
likelihood of tensions, especially in regions where secondary water sources—such as 
groundwater or rain catchment—are scarcer than the rivers (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). 
Consider Jordan and Israel as an example where an ineffectual water treaty would have 
significant conflict implications. Second, increased demand for river water will increase 
objections to other riparians’ uses, such as agriculture or industrial use (Tir and Stinnett, 
2012). In Central Asia, the amount of water employed by downstream riparians for cotton 
irrigation is vocally objected to by its upstream neighbors. Third, Tir and Stinnett 
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anticipate an increase in coercive diplomacy, as nation-states will be less patient with the 
process of diplomacy. This could include saber rattling, threats, or economic pressures 
from the stronger riparians. Returning again to Central Asia, Uzbekistan former president 
threatened weaker Tajikistan with war over their shared water resources. And fourth, 
poorly managed transboundary basins have a spillover effect into other conflict areas, 
risking the overall exacerbation of dyadic conflicts (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 214). In other 
words, water is a good excuse to fight, irrespective of the grounds. Tir and Stinnett’s 
argument is that water scarcity, water value, and water conflict are a ladder of escalation.  
Therefore, considering the arguments raised by Tir and Stinnett, Reframing the 
Value of Water is a provision to be included in the provision list. This provision 
recommends that riparians employ reframing techniques, such as those used in prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tuersley), the behavioral economic theory that proposes people 
engage with risk in different ways. In the case of water, recognizing that people have an 
aversion to loss, this provision recommends that riparians reframe the value of water 
through a lens of mutual gain, instead of a lens of “giving”, or worse: ”losing”, water to 
another riparians. Collaboration and cooperation benefit citizens throughout the basin, 
whereas isolation and noncompliance result in higher losses overall.  
 
Vertical and Horizontal Integration 
 
Troell and Swanson (2014) highlight the importance of multilevel governance and 
the inclusion of all stakeholders, as climate change impacts will be felt across the social 
and environmental spectrum. Troell and Swanson propose mitigating the intersectoral 
and multisectoral impacts through horizontal integration, which they describe as “inter-
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institutional and intersectoral coordination and cooperation” (2014, 26) to address the 
sectoral and policy fragmentation. A possible example would be integrating reforestation 
plans into official water management, a concept promoted broadly by organizations like 
The Nature Conservancy (www.plantabillion.org). Accompanying horizontal integration 
is vertical integration, meaning governance coordination in basin planning that ranges 
from local to regional to international levels (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 27). Troell and 
Swanson extend this approach to even the household level, where adaptability should 
relate to and inform basin wide policies (2014, 27). Two examples of attempts at vertical 
and horizontal integration are the 1992 Convention of the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Public Participation in 
Environmental Decision-Making. The 1992 Convention established norms for 
stakeholder engagement in international governance; the 1998 Aarhus Convention is 
international law that, in turn, reinforces the 1992 Convention (Troell and Swanson, 
2014, 27).  
 Green et al. (2013) echo a similar sentiment regarding vertical integration:  
“In addition to including multiple levels of governance and 
nongovernmental local action, resilience thinking assures that the 
coordination must at least occur at the scale of the socio-ecological system 
involved but must include linkage to multiple scales of governance to 
allow adaptive response” (2013, 5).  
 
Resiliency in a basin is closely tied to governance at multiple levels. This also parallels 
the discussion on factors for resiliency in the resiliency section above.  
 Therefore, the Vertical and Horizontal Integration provision is a provision to be 
included in the provision list. The provision aims to break down the siloed and 
fragmented approaches to water management through horizontal integration—the inter-
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institutional and -sectoral inclusion in coordination and management, and vertical 
integration—the multi-level governance inclusion in coordination and management.  
 
Addressing Hydrologic Variability 
 
Water sharing agreements typically include institutional aspects for water 
allocation. The four most common methods are proportional allocation, fixed flow 
allocation, a combination of proportional and fixed flow, and non-water transfers (Ansink 
and Ruijs, 2008). Proportional allocation gives a percentage of river flow to riparians 
(such as 28% to A and 72% to B), whereas fixed flow allocation uses specific metrics of 
river flow (such as 39,200 MCM to A and 140,000 MCM to B). A combination method 
grants riparians certain minimums, and then allocates the remainder by percentage. For 
example, Ansink and Ruijs highlight the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between Egypt 
and Sudan, which grants specific million cubic meters per country, and then grants 
percentages of the remaining flow (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008, 251).2 Finally, non-water 
transfers include the transfer of lump sums, annual payments, exchanged resources, and 
even the absence of militarized conflict (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008).  
Green et al. (2013) report that riparians rarely define water allocations, and those 
that do, do so in a way that ignores hydrologic variation. Of the 145 transboundary river 
treaties signed in the 20th century, nearly half address water allocation, but few address 
hydrologic variability (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014). Green et 
a. (2013) found that, statistically, only percentage-based allocation promotes resiliency. 
                                                     
2 Egypt receives 48,000 MCM per year and Sudan receives 4,000 MCM per year. Of the 
remaining flow, Sudan receives 66% and Egypt receives 34%. 
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This compliments findings by Dinar et al. (2010), which found that no allocation method, 
fixed allocation, or allocation of the entire river increased basin tensions. This was 
similar to findings by Ansink and Ruijs (2008), who found that an agreement where the 
downstream riparian is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability. 
However, Ansink and Ruijs found that the highest stability is when the upstream riparian 
is allocated a fixed amount—even higher than if riparians have proportional allocations 
(Ansink and Ruijs, 2008).3 
Significant to climate change, however, is Ansink and Ruijs’ (2008) finding that 
decreased river flow decreases agreement stability, yet increased variance can either 
increase or decrease stability. In other words, variability offers opportunity to ensure 
cooperation and stability are the norm. Without mechanisms to adapt to variations in river 
flow, it is less likely that riparians will comply with the terms of the water agreement. 
Therefore, Addressing Hydrologic Variability is a provision to be included in the 
provision list. Though quantity and quality will vary by context, this provision proposes 
that the mechanisms of allocation should either grant the upstream riparians a fixed 
amount of water or grant all riparians a percentage of the water.  
 
Monitoring 
 
    Monitoring provisions have wide support in the literature. Tir and Stinnett (2012) 
described monitoring provisions as the mandated collection of data. They argue that this 
                                                     
3 The authors recognize that a different study found proportional allocation to be more efficient 
than fixed flow allocation. However, efficiency is distinct from stability. The authors believe 
stability is more critical in light of climate change. 
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provision is especially important for climate change, where water shortages could be 
caused by climatic issues like drought, instead of political issues like upstream overuse. 
Monitoring provisions prevent some conflicts through information. Similarly, the 
transparency that accompanies monitoring can alleviate fears that riparians are using 
more than their fair share. 
 Green et al. write that monitoring is an important cooperative process for 
riparians, citing the findings of Dinar et al. (2010), which found a correlation between 
monitoring and fewer grievances between riparians. Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) 
write that monitoring allows parties to become aware of unexpected basin conditions, and 
also allow riparians to consider adjusting or amending the current agreement.  
 As such, Monitoring is a provision added to the provision list. Monitoring is a 
process-oriented focus on mutual collection of data through continued collaboration and 
shared resources. The mandated collection of data further assists in climate change 
resiliency by clarifying water supply changes (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). Therefore, this 
provision recommends that water agreements require regular, publicly available, and 
ongoing joint monitoring of shared water supplies. Particular emphasis should be placed 
on climate changes and future modelling of hydrologic changes.  
 
Dispute Resolution 
 
Considering that a major motivation to study agreements is to mitigate and 
prevent conflict, it is of little surprise that conflict resolution is identified as an important 
provision within water agreements by most authors. D'Estrée and Colby (2004) identify 
the ability to resolve future disputes as a measure of success; Tir and Stinnett (2012) 
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identify dispute resolution as a significant provision within water agreements; and Green 
et al. (2013) write that dispute resolution mechanisms are a “failsafe” for noncompliance 
and defection. Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) highlight the Pact of Bogota, or the 1948 
American Treaty on Pacific Settlements, as an example of dispute resolution process. It 
begins with negotiation, escalates to mediation, and then, if parties were unable to resolve 
the dispute, moves to arbitration under the International Court of Justice (2014, 64).  
 As such, Dispute Resolution is a provision added to the provision list. Possibly the 
most important of all provisions, this one promotes direct and collaborative resolution 
through a provision that is culturally relevant, clearly defined, and complete with 
escalation plans and a pre-identified, mutually-acceptable third party. Such a provision is 
foundational to a resilient transboundary river agreement.  
 
Enforcement 
 
Provisions for enforcement are also broadly supported in the literature. Tir and 
Stinnett (2012) purport that enforcement provisions give bite to agreements, dissuading 
riparians who would cheat from doing so. The authors argue that if sanctioning and 
similar punishments are detailed in an agreement, then enforcements are seen as more 
legitimate and less retaliatory or reactionary. Green et al. (2013) also argue that an 
enforcement provision is important to a water agreement. They write that enforcement 
can also be structured through positive means, such as benefit-sharing or through a 
mechanism that ties water to another interdependent issue, such as trade. By targeting 
areas critical to riparians, compliance becomes self-enforcing (Green et al., 2013). 
D'Estrée and Colby (2004) similarly discuss compliance as the most common indicator of 
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success in an agreement; it is logical, then, that a mechanism that encourages compliance 
would be a mechanism that increases the likelihood of its success.  
Therefore, considering its importance in the literature, Enforcement is a provision 
on the provision list. The provision should be strong enough to dissuade riparians from 
cheating, while also predetermining what punishments are legitimate responses. This 
provision recommends dictating enforcement-oriented discipline that is contextually 
feasible and well publicized as the response to noncompliance.  
 
Technical and Financial Cooperation  
 
A less common, but important provision pertains to the ability to execute 
elements of an agreement, particularly the technical and financial elements. A major 
barrier to overcome within an agreement is infrastructure. For example, how 
infrastructure is to be implemented has impacts on the feasibility of its implementation. 
Jeuland discusses how international conditionalities on water infrastructure “may be 
altering riparians’ willingness and ability to develop their water resources” (2017, 344). 
He argues that international funders and development organizations impose the economic 
burden of conditionalities on developing countries—a way of projecting “conditionalities 
that the developed countries had not faced during their own development process” 
(Jeuland, 2017, 345). These conditionalities include integrated water resource 
management, power production, stakeholder engagement, and scrutiny during the design 
and implementation of projects like dams. Though conditionalities may be important in 
the safe and sustainable operationalizing of infrastructure, the technical and financial 
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elements require significant cooperation. This cooperation should be determined within 
the water agreement.  
Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) further underscore the critical role that technical 
and financial cooperation play in harnessing resources for research, development, 
emergency funds, and offsetting impacts of climate change. They use the Convention on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube as an example of this 
cooperation. The treaty assures riparians that “mutual assistance upon the request of other 
Contracting Parties" will be given in times of crisis (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014, 61).  
As such, the Technical and Financial Cooperation provision is part of the 
provision list. Coordination of financial and technical efforts is important to the 
environmental and infrastructural health of a basin. This provision proposes an insurance 
mechanism specifically geared for funding emergencies and critical infrastructure, as 
well as for the gradual development of technology needed to maintain basin health. By 
establishing clear guidelines for its use, by contributing equitably, and by pooling 
resources, the provision establishes resilient responsiveness for climate change.  
 
Institutional Learning 
 
An intriguing proposition for continuous improvement, provisions related to the 
idea of institutional learning were hinted or suggested in the literature. Green et al. (2013) 
frame a provision for adaptive management as a means to address the continuation of 
learning and adaptation in an agreement. The authors recommend establishing “iterative 
processes,” or cyclical systems for improvement, into the management of a shared basin 
(2013). In d'Estrée and Colby’s (2004) framework, the purpose behind the evaluation of 
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conflict resolution in water agreements is to further institutional learning, to address what 
worked and what did not, and then to reform aspects that need improvement.  
Considering the importance of adaptation and flexibility within resiliency, 
Institutional Learning is a provision added to the provision list to enable the 
intergovernmental bodies governing a watershed to modify or enhance practices through 
self-improvement. Institutional learning includes monitoring and evaluation, feedback 
loops (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014), and training within the institution. This provision 
broadly captures a need for ever-improving performance and accountability.  
 
Transparency  
 
 Transparency is a theme among provision literature that, though not necessarily 
captured in a singular provision, resonates within other provisions. Tir and Stinnett 
(2012) refer to transparency as a reason for monitoring. Green et al. (2013) refer to 
transparency as a reason for enforcement, as transparency encourages compliance. 
Drieschova and Eckstine (2014) propose a provision for data sharing as a transparent 
mechanism. They write that data sharing promotes “harmonization,” because when all 
parties have the same information, misunderstandings are less likely.  
 As such, Transparency and Trust Building is a provision added to the provision 
list. This provision specifically aims to reduce distrust between riparians resulting from 
water scarcity (Tir and Stinnett, 2012) through data sharing. This prevents other riparians 
from employing enforcement mechanisms unjustifiably, allows riparians to engage 
flexibility mechanisms on the momentum of cooperation, and grants veracity to tracking 
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the impacts of climate change. This provision specifically differs from Monitoring 
because of its psychological and relational emphasis.  
 
Prior Notice 
 
 Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identify prior notice and consultation as a 
provision to be included in water agreements. They outline the two halves of prior notice: 
first, that riparians will consult the other; second, that riparians agree not to begin 
potentially impactful activities without consent of the other. The authors write that 
though prior notice and consultation are obligatory under international law, including the 
1997 U.N. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
including a provision within an agreement enhances trust and certainty.  
 Therefore, Prior Notice is a provision to be included on the provision list. 
Stipulating the provision in a water agreement provides a structured mechanism for 
reducing basin stress and enhancing riparian trust. Ultimately, this provision aims to be 
“conducive to the search for cooperative solutions that meet changing water priorities” 
(Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014, 63).  
Amendment  
 
 An amendment provision is, essentially, a flexibility mechanism that 
institutionalizes a lesson learned or eventuality come to pass. Drieschova and Eckstein 
(2014) argue that it makes an agreement “inherently more adaptable.” An amendment 
mechanism allows governance to shift with new scientific or technological advances, or 
when water flows have changed. This mechanism would be well suited for many climate-
change-impacted contexts. Consider, for example, the Aral Sea Basin in Central Asia: 
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agriculture and cotton account for a large percentage of the economy, demanding 
significant and seasonal irrigation supply. As economic development and urbanization 
reshape regional growth, water usage will change accordingly. An amendment 
mechanism would allow the Central Asian riparians to adapt their agreements to the new 
context, through a consensus-based process that becomes a permanent treaty amendment.  
 The Amendment provision is added to the provision list as an extreme flexibility 
measure. It builds upon preexisting cooperation to adapt to unexpected circumstances 
without forfeiting the collaborative progress made up to that point. Amendments can be 
proposed on an as-needed basis, or following certain scenarios like scientific 
breakthroughs or extended droughts. Regardless, the provision enhances the resiliency of 
an agreement.  
 
Prioritization of Use  
 
 A provision detailing the prioritization of water use allows riparians to plan for 
allocation in times of scarcity (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014). The idea, as articulated 
by Drieschova and Eckstein, is that the provision provides substantive flexibility while 
recognizing the essential human element of water allocation. For example, riparians 
could prioritize household use first, and scaling up into agriculture, environment, 
hydropower, and other economic or industrial needs. This method not only allows 
adaptability to water quantity, but to water demands (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014). 
The provision dovetails with a point raised by Tir and Stinnett (2012), when they 
highlighted that, in times of river scarcity, riparian water use becomes a source of 
conflict. They highlighted agricultural and industrial use as being particularly 
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controversial. A provision like Drieschova and Eckstein’s would enable riparians to 
determine priorities prior to the time of scarcity, thereby reducing conflict.  
 As such, the provision of Prioritization of Water Use is added to the provision list 
to address the need within agreements for substantive flexibility. The goal of this 
provision is to provide a scale of priorities for times of water scarcity, emergencies, and 
unexpected changes to the hydrologic system.  
 
Communication Channels 
 
 Foundational to enhancing any relationship, and especially for encouraging 
quality cooperation and coordination, are functional communication channels. Like 
transparency, communication is a theme prevalent in the literature on provisions, but not 
as a stand-alone mechanism. Green et al. (2013) discuss the importance of 
communication within governance and information sharing. Drieschova and Eckstein 
(2014) underscore communication in their provision for data sharing, arguing that data 
sharing “can inaugurate the first communication channels” (60). D'Estrée and Colby 
(2004) measure the success of the relationship between parties through indicators related 
to communication: general relationship quality, reduction in hostility, and cognitive shifts 
in perception of the other party.  
 However, considering communication’s role in any bi- or multilateral agreement, 
the provision for Communication Channels is included on the provision list. The 
provision should include preferred channels, the minimum frequency of communication, 
and who is to be included in what types of communications. This latter stipulation could 
include forums for regional countries or basin-specific stakeholder engagement. The 
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provision’s ultimate purpose is to increase the quality of communication, to promote the 
attributes needed to withstand negative climate change pressures.  
 
Provisions from Conflict and Water Literature 
 
There are a number of active water conflicts in the world, and a host of research 
on the factors and circumstances that prevent or inflame them. Researchers have 
examined the impacts of geography, methods of allocation, power relations, population 
size, and even financial options of riparians, in order to identify factors related to conflict. 
In this section, root causes of water conflicts are examined as impetus for the creation of 
corresponding provisions. Though the research does not directly propose provisions, 
provisions are extracted from the instigators of conflict to reduce the likelihood of 
conflict. By doing so, the goal is to increase an agreement’s ability to withstand negative 
trajectories.  
 
Reciprocal Resource Trade  
 
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the geographic location of a riparian in a river 
basin can increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict or cooperation. The authors 
examined four scenarios of up- and downstream riparians, with emphasis on the impact 
of energy production (such as coal, gas, or electricity) in the relationship. The empirical 
research showed that militarized conflict was most common between riparians that 
produced no energy (56%), yet risk was highest for militarized conflict when the 
downstream riparian has no energy resources of its own and therefore must use force to 
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protect its water rights (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). By comparison, the lowest risk of 
conflict is when the downstream riparian has its own energy resources, while the 
upstream riparian does not. The authors essentially found that when riparians could 
reciprocate resources—energy for water, and vice versa—the basin was less prone to 
militarized conflict. Resource interdependence is good for basin stability.  
This interdependence is exemplified by the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins in 
Central Asia (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the upstream 
riparians with significant energy deficiencies; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the 
downstream users with sufficient energy resources. Previously, regional conflict has been 
caused by the seasonality of water demands. On one hand, the downstream users need 
water for irrigation during the growing season. On the other, the upstream riparians need 
hydroelectricity during the cold winter months. Because water shortages are chronic, 
winter releases contribute to the water allocation quotas of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
which aggravate their political and economic concerns. Reciprocal energy trade offers a 
solution to the seasonality problem. By employing reciprocal energy trade, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan can import energy from the downstream riparians during the winter 
months—when ordinarily hydroelectricity would be required to meet the heightened 
wintertime energy demands—allowing for greater releases during the summer months, 
when the thirsty cotton crops require substantial irrigation.  
Therefore, since trading resources can both be included in water agreements and 
is shown to reduce the likelihood of conflict, Reciprocal Resource Trade is a provision 
included on the provision list. Trading resources-for-resources enhances interdependence 
and balances power. Thus, the purpose of this provision is to promote basin stability.  
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Recognition of Rights 
 
 A source of regular conflict is the recognition of rights. Rights are tied closely to 
identity and respect, and are a prevalent issue in many ongoing disputes. Consider, for 
example, the recognition of Israel in its negotiations in the Middle East. Though not as 
volatile nor publicized, recognition of rights to water is likewise important. In the Indus 
Waters Treaty, following nine years of negotiations and a bloody post-colonial rupture, 
the recognition of rights to water constitutes much of the treaty’s preamble. In the case 
study later in this thesis, recognition of rights to water dominates much of the early 
Central Asian water treaty.  
 The proposed provision for Recognition of Rights is added to the provision list to 
recognize the entrenched psychological need of rights. The recognition of someone’s 
rights soothes their fears, builds trust, and establishes a playing field as equals. This 
provision requires the articulation of rights of all riparians within the agreement. The 
underlying belief is that satisfying a psychological concern will promote stability, and 
therefore resiliency, in a basin.  
 
Power Balancing 
 
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the greater the power imbalance between 
riparians, the less likely militarized conflict is (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). Their finding 
syncs with multiple examples, but may be best exemplified in the transboundary 
relationship of the U.S. and Canada, which shares twelve distinct transboundary basins 
(See Image 1.4). The U.S., which has a population of 325.7 million and a GDP of $18.57 
trillion, dwarfs its geographically-larger but politically-smaller neighbor Canada, which 
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has a population of 36.29 million and a GDP of $1.53 trillion (World Bank via Google 
Data). The power imbalance could be a factor in the overwhelming success of the 
International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada in managing the shared 
water resources. The sentiment was well summarized by Canada’s former Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau, who said of Canada’s relationship with the United States: “Living next to 
you is, in some ways, like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-
tempered is the beast...one is affected by every twitch and grunt” (CBC Archives, 1969).  
Image 1.4 The Twelve Shared River Basins of the US and Canada (IJC) 
 
Therefore, considering that many transboundary basins do not have a significant 
power imbalance between riparians, the provision for Power Balancing is on the 
provision list. This provision aims to address the multitude of basins that are more prone 
to militarized conflict because they lack a clear hegemon. The provision articulates 
designating power-balancing through third party consultants and arbitrators, in order to 
place contestation between riparians in a neutral context.  
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Population Pressures 
 
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the larger the population, the greater the risk 
of militarized conflict. The inference is that larger populations place greater pressure on 
governments to provide water, while also inflating the amount of water needed even in 
emergencies. This finding correlates with several of the most prominent water disputes of 
today, including Ethiopia and Egypt, with 102.4 million people and 95.69 million people 
respectively, and India and Pakistan, with 1.3 billion people and 193 million people 
respectively (World Bank via Google Data). MIT professor Elfatih A B Eltahir writes to 
the former example, purporting that population pressures in the Nile Basin are largely at 
fault for rising tensions. Eltahir writes that the current population growth is unsustainable 
for both land and water use in the region, thereby escalating tensions (2017, Nature Asia).  
The lesson to be extracted from this finding is that a provision for Alleviating 
Population Pressures should be added to the provision list. This provision recommends 
addressing the greater strains of a population through contextually appropriate technical 
solutions that increase water storage capacity. These solutions may include aquifer 
recharge, dams, irrigation canals, or other engineering solutions that facilitate supply to 
larger populations in times of need.  
 
Provisions from Adaptability in Water Management  
 
 Inspiration for provisions are sourced from more than just academic literature. 
Adaptability-in-practice, or the application of adaptability mechanisms in water 
management, gives insight to provisions that guide water management towards resiliency. 
39 
 
 
These specifically include provisions for the environment and for flexibility. The 
following discussion will better detail the relationship between flexibility and 
environmental management, and how intentional inclusion of both can increase the 
resiliency within a water agreement.  
One IUCN report states: “Adaptation to climate change refers to adjustment in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (emphasis added, 
Barchiesi et al., 2014, 16). In other words, adaptation in the era of climate change will 
require adjustment, but not necessarily in negative ways. There is opportunity for 
adaptive and flexible provisions to shape the management of natural resources like water. 
Jeuland (2017) writes:  
“Climate change offers perhaps the starkest example of the complexity 
induced by human-nature system interconnections...The sheer complexity 
of the suite of potential changes, and the particular exposure of the water 
sector to them, have led researchers to propose a range of new methods 
that...emphasize the need to invest in ways that maintain adaptive 
flexibility.” (p. 347) 
 
Flexibility is not a new concept in the realm of water treaty research. Drieschova 
and Eckstein (2014) argue that formalized flexibility has three benefits for riparians. 
First, flexibility can increase the pace of amendments to an agreement necessary for 
responding to climate change. Second, flexibility can ease the process of negotiating an 
agreement, because flexibility reduces the rigidity of an agreement. Third, flexibility 
allows for maintaining the spirit of an agreement without the original wording (2014, 52).  
Adaptive capacity, however, is a newer concept in the realm of water treaty 
research. Smit and Pilifosova (2001) define adaptive capacity as “the potential or ability 
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of a system, region, or community to adapt to the effects or impacts of climate change,” 
and that its enhancement “represents a practical means of coping with changes and 
uncertainties in climate, including variability and extremes…reduc[ing] vulnerabilities 
and promot[ing] sustainable development” (quoted in Stucker and Lopez-Gunn, 2014, 3). 
In other words, adaptive capacity is resiliency-building; it is strengthening the 
mechanisms necessary for mitigating impacts of climate change and enhancing 
cooperation. The concept of adaptive capacity can be, and should be, a means for 
determining resilient provisions. The approach emphasizes capacity for coping and 
withstanding climate change—a foundational aspiration in the application of resiliency 
theory to water agreements.  
 
Flexibility Mechanism 
 
As discussed above, flexibility within an agreement offers multiple advantages to 
riparians, and is critical to resiliency in an agreement. Flexibility is a term promoted in 
practice by the IUCN, by the UN, and in the literature. Green et al. (2013) articulate the 
need within agreements to respond to changed circumstances on short notice, as well as 
for iterative processes promoting resiliency. Likewise, Dinar et al. (2015) found that 
flexibility mechanisms had a positive correlation with a treaty’s long-term effectiveness.  
In response to support for the concept, a provision for Flexibility is added to the 
provision list. Though a flexibility provision overlaps with many pre-identified 
provisions, such as the Amendment and Monitoring provisions, flexibility allow for 
impromptu or short-notice adjustments to governance without, necessarily, long-term 
implementation of the flexible action. Flexibility also allows riparians to incorporate 
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lessons-learned from the field of water management, such as Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM, discussed below) or other management frameworks.  
 
Environmental Considerations  
 
 Adaptive capacity illumines the importance of including the environment in 
agreements. Impacts to the environment are inherent to water agreements, especially in 
agreements that include water allocation, infrastructure, and industry. Troell and 
Swanson write that environmental flows, meaning “the quality, quantity, and time of 
freshwater flows,” are “critical to maintaining ecosystem health and resilience, especially 
in basins that are already subject to significant levels of abstractive use and pollution” 
(2014, 28, emphasis added). The eventualities of the environment deserve to be 
incorporated in governance.  
The concept has been explored through adaptability practices, such as Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM). IWRM is defined by the Global Water 
Partnership as “a process which promotes the coordinated development and management 
of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems” (UN, “IWRM”, 2014, emphasis added). The backbone of IWRM is the 
inclusive, participatory planning process; it involves stakeholders in the management of 
nature, in order to address concepts such as sustainability, interconnectivity, 
accountability, and adaptability (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 29).  
Considering how the environment has been included in other frameworks, a 
provision for Environmental Considerations is added to the provision list. This provision 
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articulates the rights of and obligations to the environment within an agreement. It 
increases the stability of the agreement in the long term, by mitigating the negative 
environmental impacts of a treaty and ensuring that necessary water flows for the 
environment exist, thereby ensuring the future of the water agreement itself.  
 
Creation of Provisions List 
 
    Over the course of reviewing relevant literature, many provisions were extracted 
to establish a comprehensive list of provisions for climate change resiliency in 
transboundary river agreements. Each provision may not apply in every context, but the 
argument is that the majority combined will enhance any transboundary river agreement 
regardless of culture, geographical location, or basin challenges. That being said, the base 
assumptions behind the provisions are the same assumptions underlying interest-based 
negotiations: that parties negotiate in good faith, look for win-win solutions, prioritize 
long-term relationships over short-term victories, and set aside positions for mutually-
satisfying solutions. These provisions are foundationless without good-faith riparians. 
    Structurally, the list is divided between enhancement and mitigation provisions. 
Enhancement provisions facilitate cooperation in areas more likely to be collaborative; 
mitigation provisions reduce escalation in situations identified to be more prone to 
conflict. The purpose in creating two lists is to underscore the significance of both in 
addressing impacts of climate change. 
    Furthermore, the organization below extends beyond that of Drieschova and 
Eckstein, who organized a like-minded list of “rules” into substantive and procedural 
categories (2014), by adding a category for psychological needs. The organization below 
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thereby represents the three types of interests discussed in earlier chapters (Moore, 2003, 
75). The triangle of interests, or needs, can be defined thusly: substantive interests refer 
to goods, such as quantity of water; procedural interests refer to the process of addressing 
needs, such as using the World Bank as mediator or attaining assurance of an annual 
forum to address irrigation; and finally, psychological interests are the emotional and 
relationship needs, such as ensuring cordial riparian cooperation. The list below considers 
psychological needs as a critical consideration because of the complex nature of a 
riparian and between riparians. 
    The list is comprised of 20 provisions, divided into enhancement and mitigation 
columns, and organized according to the three categories of interests (see Table 1.2). It is 
noteworthy that the majority of provisions generated from the literature are procedural. 
The reason is three-part. First, substantive and psychological interests are highly 
contextual. The substantive needs of Israel and the West Bank will differ in specifics 
from those of Egypt and Ethiopia, as infrastructure, climate, supply, population size, and 
economy are just a few of many factors that shape specific substantive needs. Similarly, 
the psychological needs are influenced by time, place, and politics: the chemistry 
between negotiators, the stability of a political regime, power imbalances between 
riparians, and a host of other relationship and emotional demands define psychological 
interests. In contrast, procedural needs are generic.  
    Second, there is no sure way of predicting substantive and psychological interests 
in a future shaped by climate change. Procedural mechanisms, on the other hand, offer a 
route to future modifications, when psychological or substantive interests have changed. 
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Procedural mechanisms are less time-restrained, less impacted by climatic shifts, and less 
likely to be wholly reshaped within the lifetime of an agreement.  
    Finally, the following list is procedural-heavy because the list’s purpose is to 
enhance resiliency, and resiliency is action-based. In other words, of the three categories, 
procedural provisions address the actions for ensuring an agreement can withstand 
climate-induced changes. Procedural provisions are the process to resiliency. Substantive 
and psychological interests, though important, will carry less weight in the withstanding 
future impacts—especially in a climate changed future—than procedural interests.  
Table 1.2: The Provision List  
  Mitigation Enhancement 
Procedural 
Interests 
1.  Enforcement 
2.  Dispute resolution 
3.  Monitoring 
4.  Amendment  
5.  Flexibility mechanisms 
1.  Intergovernmental institutions 
2.  Vertical / horizontal integration 
3.  Financial / technical cooperation 
4.  Communication channels 
5.  Institutional learning  
6.  Prior notice and consultation 
Psychological 
Interests 
1.  Power balancing 
2.  Alleviating population 
pressures 
3.  Reframing value of water 
1.  Transparency and trust-building  
2.  Recognition of rights 
Substantive 
Interests 
1.  Addressing hydrologic 
variability 
2.  Prioritization of water use 
1.  Reciprocal resource trade 
2.  Environmental considerations  
 
 As detailed in the prior chapters, provisions for the provision list were specifically 
extracted because of ties to attributes that align with resiliency: cooperation, reduced 
conflict, the likelihood to endure or even thrive in crises. As such, these provisions are 
specifically tailored to water agreements, and even more specifically to climate change 
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impacts on water agreements. The relevance of the provision list to other types of 
environmental agreements has not been considered.4  
 In the following section, a treaty heralded as a resilient success is examined in the 
context of the provision list. The International Boundary and Water Commission of the 
U.S. and Mexico employs several provisions listed in Table 1.2 to enhance its capacity 
for managing environmental impacts related to both climate change and human 
mismanagement. Following a discussion of the U.S-Mexico treaty, the provision list will 
be applied in its entirety to the Central Asian case study to determine whether the 
provision list can illumine a region widely recognized for its latent water conflicts, which 
occasionally erupt into border violence and escalated political rhetoric.  
  
Flexibility in U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission   
 
 Troell and Swanson (2014) highlight the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC), established by a treaty between the U.S. and Mexico as a strong 
example of innovative basin management. It is an opportunity to consider the success of 
provisions in water agreements, and prompt discussion of provisions’ role in resiliency. 
The duties of the IBWC have evolved since its establishment in 1899 to include the 
implementation of water agreements, resolution of disputes, and distribution and 
regulation of the Colorado River. The IBWC also makes managerial and operational 
                                                     
4 Throughout the remainder of the thesis, when discussion a specific provision related to the 
provision list, its shorthand reference will be used. First, each reference has either S, Pr, or Ps: S 
is for Substantive; Pr is for Procedural; and Ps is for Psychological. Next, the interest is followed 
by the type of provision: M is for Mitigation and E is for Enhancement. And finally, the reference 
ends in the number of each provision. For example, Power Balancing is the first psychological 
interest in the mitigation column. It’s shorthand reference is PsM1. 
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recommendations to the governments of the United States and Mexico (Troell and 
Swanson, 2014, 37). Most importantly, the IBWC act as the treaty implementers.  
The flexibility mechanism of the IBWC is particularly unique because of how 
effective it has been in allowing the IBWC to adapt on short notice to unforeseen 
environmental situations, or what Troell and Swanson call innovative basin management. 
This mechanism, the so-called “minute process,” allows the IBWC to create or amend 
rules to the basin treaties that guide their governance. Troell and Swanson explain that 
the minutes of a formal decision by the IBWC are forwarded to the Mexican and 
American governments; the minutes are considered approved if neither government 
rejects the amendment within 30 days (2014, 38). This allows the IBWC to act as needed 
with minimal oversight.  
The minute process is particularly relevant to the discussion on provisions 
because of what it has contributed to: the impressive ability of the U.S. and Mexico to 
adapt to difficult basin conditions. The example used by Troell and Swanson is Minute 
319, created in November 2012 as an amendment for interim measures that look 
remarkably similar to parts of the provision list. The interim measures included water 
storage for Mexico in case of shortages (PsM2), environmental considerations (SE2), a 
mechanism for water exchange (SE1), and evaluations for informing future measures 
(PrE5) (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 39). Furthermore, it involved stakeholders throughout 
the vertical and horizontal realms (PrE2), including Native tribes, environmental NGOs, 
national and state governments, and more throughout multiple sectors. The authors 
specifically highlight one agreement stemming from Minute 319 as a success of adaptive 
basin management. As a coordinated irrigation effort, the U.S. and Mexico exchanged 
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resources (SE1)—the U.S. contributed $21 million and technical expertise (PrE3) to 
improving Mexico’s water infrastructure in exchange for 124,000 acre-feet of Mexico’s 
water (PsM3) (2014, 39). Ultimately, the collaboration will mimic a natural flood to 
create 2,000 acres of wetland habitat, also improving Mexico’s environment (SM2, SE2).  
Of course, the definition of success is not a universal standard, and Drieschova 
and Eckstein use the same study of the U.S. and Mexico to underscore instability (2014, 
54). A major drought in the late 1990s led to the U.S. and Mexico escalating their 
grievances on flow obligations to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. Mexico claimed it was unable to meet its obligations, and the U.S. 
claimed Mexico was unwilling. No resolution was reached until the drought ended in 
2005. The argument of Drieschova and Eckstein is that the rigidity of the flow mandates 
within the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty—one of the treaties under which the IBWC 
operates—restricted the riparians’ ability to resolve their conflict through alternative 
means; it failed to address hydrologic variability (SM1). The implicit question that arises 
from this argument, then, is: what is the balance between articulating the perfect 
agreement and implementing a resilient, productive relationship?  
 
Conclusion of Section One 
 
 The conversations thus far have emphasized the relationship between provisions 
and the improvement of resiliency in water agreements. Yet all have assumed, implicitly 
or explicitly, the positive relationship between the content of an agreement and the 
governance conditions of a basin. This baseline assumption that resiliency inherently 
stems from provisions undergirded the initial research question: how can water 
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agreements satisfy parties' needs while also considering the future uncertainties of 
climate-induced changes to their basins’ hydrological systems, in order to promote 
climate change resiliency?  
The concept of provisions has been tested in case studies ranging from the US and 
Mexico (above) to the Okavango River Basin (Green et al., 2013). However, the case 
studies represented in the literature have used partial lists of provisions—such as the four 
provisions of enforcement, conflict resolution, intergovernmental institutions, and 
monitoring proposed by Tir and Stinnett (2012)—or through the lens of underscoring the 
benefits of provisions, which comes with potential bias. 
The following case study examines two of the agreements used to govern the 
Amu Darya and the Syr Darya basins of Central Asia. The region is an area of personal 
significance to the author, plagued by failing water infrastructure, latent water conflicts, 
and a heightened vulnerability to climate change due to its glacier-fed river basins and 
contemporary Aral Sea disaster. Combined, these factors presented a case study ideal for 
applying the provision list.  
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Section Two 
 
“Water, thou hast no taste, no color, no odor; canst not be defined, art relished while 
ever mysterious. Not necessary to life, but rather life itself, thou fillest us with a 
gratification that exceeds the delight of the senses...For thou, water, art a proud divinity, 
allowing no alteration, no foreignness in thy being.” 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Wind, Sand and Stars 
 
Image 2.1. Map of Central Asia  
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Provisions: A Steppe in the Right Direction?  
 
 The concept of provisions has been tested in case studies ranging from the U.S. 
and Mexico to the Okavango River Basin of southwest Africa (Troell and Swanson, 
2014; Green et al., 2013). However, the case studies represented in the literature need 
supplementation for three reasons. First, the case studies represented in the literature have 
used partial lists of provisions, such as the four provisions of enforcement, conflict 
resolution, intergovernmental institutions, and monitoring proposed by Tir and Stinnett 
(2012). Second, the case studies have been applied through the lens of proving the 
benefits of provisions in agreements, therefore creating the risk for bias in the selection of 
cases and provisions. And third, the case studies used in the literature have failed to 
answer the question of whether the content of agreement is directly responsible for the 
success of an agreement.  
 The following case study examines two agreements used to govern the Amu 
Darya and Syr Darya basins of Central Asia. It is a region tucked out-of-sight and out-of-
mind from much of international affairs; it draws up images of nomads in yurts and 
Himalayan hikes without correlation to modernity. The region is an area of personal 
significance to the author, and is plagued by failing water infrastructure, latent water 
conflicts, and a heightened vulnerability to climate change due to its glacier-fed river 
basins and contemporary Aral Sea disaster.  
 The first section will paint a broader picture of the key actors of Central Asia, as 
well as its recent history of conflicts directly and indirectly tied to water. The second 
section will examine two of the major agreements governing water resources—the 1992 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and 
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Conservation of Interstate Sources, and the 2008 Statute of the Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination of Central Asia—through an in-depth analysis of the present 
provisions, the discourse and text of the agreements, and the relative significance of the 
agreements. The final section will discuss the findings of the analysis. The case study will 
conclude with the implications for future research areas, and for the field of provision 
research.  
 
Analysis of Central Asia’s Water Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
 “We must resolve water issues in the interests of all our countries including issues 
related to hydropower construction, water releases, and electricity sharing,” Kazakhstan’s 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced on March 15, 2018, ahead of the first Central 
Asian summit in nearly ten years (RFERL, March 15, 2018). The statement marked a 
dramatic change in tone from Uzbekistan’s late president Islam Karimov’s threat of “not 
just serious confrontations, but even wars” at the 2013 Forum to Balance Water and 
Energy Needs (Pacific Institute). In Central Asia’s rugged and remote corner of the 
world, defined climatically by its aridity and thirsty legacy of Soviet anti-
environmentalism, water is the backbone of economies and infrastructure. Yet, water is 
also in greater demand than supply.  
The issue of water rides along, betwixt, and above the regional conflicts of every 
sort—issues of terrorism, trade relations, war in Afghanistan, and the pockmarked 
landscape of enclaves and exclaves demarking ethnic lines. Water becomes a gambit for 
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political negotiations—hence, possibly, Nazarbayev's statement at the 2018 summit, “Our 
countries have 70 million people living here around two major rivers—the Amu Darya 
and Syr Darya—and we agreed today that no political bargaining is acceptable in the 
matter” (RFERL, March 15, 2018). It becomes a source of international attention, 
underscored by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central 
Asia (UNRCCA) and the World Bank’s Central Asia Water-Energy Development 
Program, both of which aim to alleviate water tensions in the region. And most 
alarmingly, water becomes a cause of on-the-ground violence between communities 
fighting for access and control (for timeline of specific events, see Appendix A). Border 
towns formerly interconnected by Soviet infrastructure are now vulnerable to structural 
inequalities and disparities.  
 
Ferghana Valley 
 
 Consider the Ferghana Valley as an example of this conflict interconnectivity. 
Resting in the spiral of three borders within the Syr Darya watershed, the Valley is the 
most densely populated and most agriculturally fertile region in Central Asia, home to 
multiple people groups. It is also the most conflicted region. Conflict has stemmed from 
horizontal inequalities between groups, such as the 2010 riots of Osh; from political 
unrest, as in the Andijan massacre of 2005; from religious extremism, like in the 1992 
and 2004 Tashkent bombings; and from vague borders with strict policies that limit 
movement in the formerly cohesive Soviet space. One author summarized the volatility 
of the Ferghana Valley, writing:  
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“The ill-defined borders, the problems of enclaves and exclaves, the huge 
number of socio-economic and environmental problems faced by the 
inhabitants of the region, power struggles between the political 
elites...have made [the Ferghana Valley] one of the most dangerous and 
unstable regions of the world” (Borthakur, 2017, 334).  
 
 While these conflicts have been, and continue to be, distinct social issues, the 
collective turmoil is a melting pot that simmers into frequent, concentrated, and ongoing 
disputes around water. As early as 1990, the city of Osh had manifest violence over water 
issues, stemming from deeper grievances like government representation and the Soviet 
breakup. In one instance, up to 600 people were killed before Soviet troops could 
reestablish peace (Stratfor, 2013).  
 
History of the Ferghana Valley 
 
  A variety of historical factors have concentrated conflict in the Ferghana Valley. 
Socially, Central Asia experienced dramatic shifts after the Kokand Khanate, an Uzbek 
dynasty immediately predating tsarist Russia’s rule, fell to colonization in 1876. 
Following a period of autonomy in the 1910s within the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic(the successor of tsarism and the predecessor of the USSR), Stalin 
implemented ‘divide and rule’ strategies to delineate the borders of the new Soviet 
Socialist Republics (SSRs) throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Borthakur, 2017, 336). He 
complicated the process by creating ethnic-based socialist states. The Uzbek SSR was 
founded in 1924, followed by the Tajik SSR in 1929 and the Kyrgyz and Kazakh SSRs in 
1936. This period marked the first time in Central Asia’s history that borders officially 
distinguished ethnic majorities. Ethnicity had not existed in Central Asia; people had 
previously been grouped “based on clan, region, or religion” (Strafor, 2013).  
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Ethnicity, however, was complicated. Different groups defined their origins 
differently depending on priorities of language, geographic location, or race. For 
example, the term “Uzbek” grew to include the Sart people, who were unrecognized by 
the Soviets, as well as Persian speakers—who would typically be considered Tajik—
because they lived in Uzbek-dominated cities (Borthakur, 2017, 337). These factors all 
served to create a “geographic jigsaw puzzle” of enclaves, mixed populations, and 
interdependence that perpetuates conflict today (Borthakur, 2017, 337-338; see Image 2.2 
for depiction of modern ethnic distribution).5 
Image 2.2: Demographics of the Ferghana Valley (Stratfor, 2013) 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Groups include, the three citizenships, as well as the ethnic groups of Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks, 
Russians, Tatars, Slavs, Armenians, and Meskhetian Turks (Borthakur, 2017, 336). 
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Modern Interdependence in the Ferghana Valley  
 
 The Ferghana Valley provides a concentrated illustration of the interdependence, 
interconnectivity, and similarities predating and postdating the Soviet occupation. Today, 
many of these elements continue to define and influence the relationships in Central Asia, 
especially the economic, infrastructural, and water regimes implemented by the USSR.  
Economically, agricultural output in the Valley is around 79% higher than other 
Central Asian regions, with output of about $1000 per hectare, compared to the regional 
average of $613 per hectare (Abdullaev, 2010). This heightened output is in part because 
of its geographic advantages, but it is also because of extensive infrastructure for the 
historically agrarian region. An excerpt from 1882 describes the Valley with “huge water 
channels...whole forests of shade-giving trees...fields of wheat, barley, millet sorghum, 
corn, rice, beans, sesame, flax, hemp, cotton, and alfalfa…” (Middendorf, 1882, qtd. in 
Kreutzmann, 2016, 114). It is of little surprise then, that 12 million people in a 
tumultuous geographic depression of 8,500 square miles (Young, 2003, 6), all competing 
for the same crop outputs and all dependent on decaying irrigation infrastructure, would 
fracture along group lines.  
This jigsaw puzzle was structurally ruptured by the breakup of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. With independence came the solidification of formerly permeable borders and 
the nationalization of formerly shared infrastructure, throwing the ex-SSRs into economic 
competition and social turmoil. In addition to the nation-states themselves, enclaves and 
exclaves of ethnic populations were delineated—becoming islands of citizens whose 
freedom of movement is now a pawn in disputes over resources and infrastructure 
(Kreutzmann, 2016, 120). In August 2015, for example, Tajiks blocked a road and 
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Kyrgyz blocked a water canal in a disputed region along the border of an enclave in 
Kyrgyzstan. The situation escalated into immediate violence. The Tajik border service 
reported Kyrgyz villagers using shotguns and Molotov cocktails; the Kyrgyz service 
reported 120 Tajiks and 80 Kyrgyz engaged in rock throwing (Putz, 2015). Either way, at 
least four people were injured and several homes were damaged.  
  Finally, according to Hermann Kreutzmann, author of several works on irrigation 
in Central Asia, water disputes at the community level have two roots: forced 
modernization and constraints of interdependence (Kreutzmann, 2016). Both the Tsarist 
and Soviet modernization schemes included major interconnected irrigation systems to 
expand cropland into the arid steppes of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This required mass 
diversions of water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers from their natural courses 
into the Aral Sea via dams, reservoirs, and canals, as illustrated in Image 2.3 below. As 
Kreutzmann states: “The control of regional resources and experiments with new 
technologies in the Central Asian “laboratory” enable the colonial power to envisage an 
interconnected system of producing raw materials in Central Asia and processing them in 
Russia” (2016, 116). Thus, the cotton and grains were transported north to Russia to 
support the booming textile industry and feed its burgeoning population, at the great 
expense of Central Asia’s water resources. 
The Ferghana Valley is an example of how interconnected conflict in Central Asia 
is. Social, ethnic, economic, and historical factors feed into latent conflict that erupts on 
loosely related issues— namely water—at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. 
These factors are by no means concentrated in the Ferghana Valley; they spill out and 
define much of Central Asia and its regional relations today.  
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Image 2.3. Schematic Layout of the Syr Darya Basin (PA Consortium (2002, p. 55), via Wegerich, 2011) 
 
The Aral Sea Basin 
 
The Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins flow without consideration of borders 
from the snow-capped peaks of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and onto the southerly steppes 
of Kazakhstan, before draining into the remnant of Uzbekistan’s Aral Sea. The basin 
spans 1.73 million square kilometers (668,000 square miles), with an average volume of 
118.43 cubic kilometers (28.41 cubic miles), through territory with approximately 70 
million people (FAO Water Report, 2013). Nearly every drop of the greater Aral Sea 
basin is allocated to a national interest. Unfortunately for the riparians—and even more 
so for the Aral Sea—there is little extra with which to negotiation, reallocate, or claim.  
Like the Ferghana Valley, water in the basin flows in latent conflict, awaiting a 
loosely related dispute to thrust it back into the fore. Unlike the Ferghana Valley, 
however, the conflict is typically found at the primary level, that of governments and 
diplomats, instead of at the community level. The three riparians of the Syr Darya are 
Kyrgyzstan, the upstream user, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the downstream users 
(see Image 2.4). The riparians of the Amu Darya are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Afghanistan, the upstream users, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the downstream 
users (see Image 2.5).  
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Image 2.4 Syr Darya River Basin (Wikicommons)  
  
 
Image 2.5 Amu Darya River Basin (Wikicommons)  
 
 
Aral Sea Basin Conflict Perpetrators 
 
 In addition to the conflict roots articulated in the discussion of the Ferghana 
Valley, two other themes play defining roles in the broader conflict context: actor 
instability and water use inefficiencies. First, The actors involved in Central Asia are 
volatile and unpredictable. Take, for example, the extreme pendulum swing of 
Uzbekistan within a two-year period. Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, 
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recently softened the late president Islam Karimov’s policies on regional relations 
(Michel, 2017). The foreign minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, expressed hope to start 
dialogue with its neighbors on water access and management, and that friendly relations 
are an “important foreign policy priority” for the new regime. Kamilov told the 
UNRCCA: “The preliminary acquaintance with these conventions shows quite 
reasonable approaches to resolution of this very complex issue. I hope that our neighbors 
will pay attention to this UN's proposal and we will be able to start a mutually interested 
dialogue” (Akipress, 2017). Kamilov would like the region to agree on water use, 
regulation, and compensation mechanisms. 
This is a change from the late president’s tone in 2016, when in a disagreement 
over Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam he alarmed the international community with the threat of a 
resource war with his comment that “all of this could deteriorate to the point where not 
just serious confrontation, but even wars could be the result” (Michel, 2016). Dushanbe 
signed with an Italian company, Salini Impregilo, to begin construction, despite the 
World Bank’s analysis that the Rogun could bring “large-scale threats to the entire 
region” (Michel, 2016). 
Another root of the conflict is the inefficient use of the water. Today 90% of the 
total available water resources of Central Asia are dedicated to irrigation. Soviet planning 
sought to transform Central Asia into a natural resource producer for Moscow’s 
industries, and cotton was the choice crop. Water was diverted without consideration to 
support the booming irrigation demands on the arid steppes. Consider Uzbekistan alone: 
in 1930, there was 530,000 hectares of irrigated land; in 1950, this increased to 650,000 
hectares; and by 2005, this had boomed to 1.5 million hectares (Kreutzmann, 2016, 114). 
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A large percentage of this output has been, and continues to be, cotton—the “white gold” 
of Central Asia. Between 1913 and 1990, Uzbekistan’s cotton output increased tenfold, 
and in 2011, Uzbekistan was the sixth largest cotton supplier in the world (Kreutzmann, 
2016, 115).  
Alisher Ilkhamov (2017) reiterates Kreutzmann’s argument: Central Asia 
exacerbates its own water strife through inefficient use. Up to 50% of Uzbekistan’s 
irrigation water is lost in its infrastructure networks (Ilkhamov, 2017). More concerning, 
however, is the overall water wastefulness. Ilkhamov writes that Turkmenistan consumes 
the highest rate of water per capita in the world, at a rate four times higher than the U.S 
and thirteen times higher than China. Uzbekistan is the fourth highest consumer of water 
per capita; Kyrgyzstan the fifth; Tajikistan the seventh; and Kazakhstan the eleventh 
(Ilkhamov, 2017). The exaggerated water use is primarily due to inefficient and leaky 
infrastructure.  
The instability of the regional actors and the water wastefulness, combined with 
the negative impact of the Soviet Union and the legacy of interdependence, heightened by 
ethnic conflict and horizontal inequalities, and tied together with the economic 
dependency of thirsty cotton, creates a tumultuous hotbed desperately in need of effective 
water governance. Unfortunately for Central Asia, their contemporary issues face 
extreme escalation with the threat of climate change.  
 
Climate Change in Central Asia 
 
Climate change and its relationship to conflict have been heralded as certainty by 
many outlets and underscored as a serious threat to international relations in academia. 
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Solomon (2010) writes that the implications of water scarcity create competition of 
interests between ethnic groups, social classes, and geographical habitats, stating that 
conflicts are “palpable perils in a growing number of international watersheds in some of 
the world’s most combustible regions” (p. 372). 
Bernauer and Siegfried (2012) in the Journal of Peace Research specifically 
name Central Asia as a region of concern, stating that the existing water management 
“has failed” and that disputes have persisted since the collapse of the USSR. Similarly, 
Rasool (2015) in the Journal of Central Asian Studies writes that climate change 
threatens the Central Asian region with environmental security problems in a complicated 
web of fragile state relations. Conflict caused by severe climate change, Bernauer and 
Siegfried hypothesize, will be amongst “poorer, less democratic, and politically less 
stable” riparians because of their weaker capacity for adaptation (2012). This concern ties 
to concerns of resiliency, and the necessary capacity for positive actions in thwarting a 
negative trajectory.  
 Stucker et al. (2014) examined the impacts of climate change and current water 
governance in the smaller tributaries of the Syr Darya basin, arguing that insufficient 
attention is paid to the less dominant but equally important water sources. They found 
that various factors have created an inflection point for management. Stucker et al. write: 
“...climate change, population growth, deteriorating irrigation 
infrastructure and upstream expansion of irrigated agriculture contribute 
significantly to a decreasing and more variable supply of water, an 
increasing demand on large water losses, resulting in mounting pressures 
on the environment and basin inhabitants” (2014, 63). 
 
Furthermore, the authors found that climate change in Central Asia, though difficult to 
model for a variety of reasons, is already happening. There are impacts to regional 
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climate in water volume, temperature, and precipitation. Models predict an overall 
decrease by 20% in river runoff by 2060 (Korkorin, 2010, and Westphal, 2010, qtd. in 
Stucker et al.). Ilkhamov (2017) believes overall decrease will be as high as 30%. 
Temperature increases of 0.3 to 1.2*C in the window between 1950 and 2005 have led to 
annual precipitation variations across Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Stucker et al., 2014, p. 
49). Most alarming is the Stucker et al.’s findings that, since the late 1950s, glacier 
volume in the region has shrunk by 15%6 and is only expected to accelerate in the future. 
One example is Tajikistan’s Zeravshan Glacier, which, between 1927 and 2009, retreated 
2.5km (ZEN qtd. in Stucker et al., 2014, 50). Stucker et al. similarly cite that snow cover 
area has decreased by up to 15% since the mid-90s. Of course, both snow cover and 
glacier volume contribute directly to long-term water storage capacity in an already 
water-stressed region. Ultimately, combined with permafrost melt and warmer 
precipitation, climate change threatens regional river volume, and therefore 
approximately 80% of the waters in the current Amu Darya and Syr Darya (Stucker et al., 
2014, 50). 
As climate change produces shifts in flow patterns, water disputes are likely to 
increase in intensity. Kreutzmann (2016) documented the changing characteristics of the 
Syr Darya over the past 50 years; snowmelt decreased by 20% while glacier runoff 
increased. The lower spring flows and higher autumn flows pose significant threat to the 
availability of irrigation water during the growing seasons. This heightens tensions 
between the downstream states’ demands for water and the upstream states’ willingness 
                                                     
6 The glacier shrinkage is caused by an annual melt ranging between 0.2 to 1%. 
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to provide that water, as well as internal pressures for dictatorships (all C.A. states 
excluding Kyrgyzstan) dependent on economic stability. Other ecological concerns 
include waterlogging and salinization, implying that quality of water may one day be as 
pressing of an issue as the quantity of water (Kreutzmann, 2016, p. 121). 
The various literature on climate change in Central Asia is cohesive in many 
aspects, but especially in its warnings. Climate change is already happening, and it 
threatens the status quo of a volatile region. Additionally, it is closely linked to conflict. 
The current elements of Central Asian relations, both productive and unproductive, will 
be shaped by the impending hydrologic changes. The governance and agreements over 
water need to reflect this threat.  
 
Water Agreements in Central Asia  
 
 Governance and agreements over water, however, do not reflect the threat of 
climate change. Water in Central Asia is managed hierarchically by transnational, 
national, regional, and local actors, who establish and enforce water codes, laws, and 
decrees pertaining to use. Many date back to the early and mid-1990s, and were 
established based on precedent set during the Soviet Union. That the system is flawed is 
no secret. In fact, recognition that the system of agreements is flawed includes statements 
from the countries themselves, such as Nazarbayev's blatant statement at the recent water 
forum in March 2018: “A major issue [in Central Asia] is problems around water 
sharing” (RFERL, March 18, 2018). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, one author describes the 
overall implementation on the ground as “legal nihilism” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030). 
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“Legal nihilism” may be an overstatement, as there are a few interstate and national 
layers of governance.  
The primary regional agreement is the Cooperation on Transboundary Water 
Management Treaty, signed by the five Central Asian states in 1992 following the 
breakup of the USSR to regulate and maintain water allocation throughout the entire Syr 
Darya and Amu Darya Basin. Janusz-Pawletta (2015) states that the treaty is regularly 
updated to reflect the changing needs of member states and the environmental crises 
resultant of Soviet planning, but others disagree. This treaty is critically examined in the 
following section.  
A separate treaty was signed between the users of the Syr Darya river to create 
static allocation of the waters—1% to Kyrgyzstan; 9.2% to Tajikistan; 38.1% to 
Kazakhstan, and 51.7% to Uzbekistan—as a security mechanism for the downstream 
states (Kreutzmann, 2016, 121). Similarly, in 1998, the Syr Darya riparians signed the 
“Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy resource of 
the Syr Darya Basin.” This agreement specifically noted “the common interests of the 
participating countries and the urgent need for the development of an efficient and 
coordinated water regime in the Syr Darya basin, taking into account the problems of the 
Aral Sea” (“Agreement…”, 1998). It did not develop a coordinated regime, 
unfortunately. Kazakhstan blames Uzbekistan for noncompliance; Uzbekistan denies the 
claim; and Kyrgyzstan does not follow the agreement (Mitchell and Lee, 2010, 11). 
Another relevant transnational treaty is the Interstate Coordination Water 
Commission (ICWC), also established in 1992, as a means of coordinating between 
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley. ICWC has been 
supplemented by Basin Water Organizations (BWOs), whose purposes are to implement 
the decisions of the ICWC, and also operate the major irrigation infrastructure—dams, 
gates, pumps, canals, etc.—necessary for executing the ICWC’s plans. In 2008, the 
riparians updated the treaty governing and envisioning the ICWC, in what became a 
modernized framework for governing the shared waters within the greater Aral Sea basin. 
This updated 2008 agreement is also critically examined in the following section.  
    Finally, at a national level, the Central Asian states introduced land reforms 
throughout the 1990s to both mitigate the Soviet legacy and revive the agricultural sector. 
In doing so, regulatory structures were abolished, transforming water allocation into “a 
place of contestation and competition” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030). Water Users 
Associations (WUAs) were a result of both INGO and grassroots demands for better 
management, operation, and maintenance of waterworks. Unfortunately, they were 
bureaucratically established by the thousands and few successfully developed in practice 
(Abdullaev et al., 1030). Those that did mobilize continue to face difficulties in managing 
water, collecting fees, and operating the irrigation systems (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1031). 
The weak national governance systems further complicate the overarching 
implementation of interstate agreements.  
 
Introduction to Case Study Analysis 
 
Central Asia’s water agreements provide an opportune case study for three 
reasons. First, the original agreement of 1992 was effectually replaced in 2008 by an 
expanded agreement. This allows for cross-examination to identify the additions that 
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riparians perceived to be of importance.7 Second, the updated water agreement satisfies 
many of the provisions identified in the literature as important for resiliency to climate 
change—yet, and thirdly, the agreement is hardly heralded as a successful transboundary 
river agreement, and is unlikely to withstand the heightened pressures of climate change. 
Though there are multiple agreements that could be analyzed through a governance lens 
in Central Asia, the 1992 and 2008 Agreements were selected due to their similar subject 
matter and matching signatory countries (see Appendix B for texts of the agreements).  
 The 1992 agreement was written following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and 
its language reflects the hurry to maintain a degree of interdependence. The 2008 
agreement was written following regional and global concern over the Aral Sea crisis, as 
well as during the economic recession, and its language reflects the region’s 
environmental and financial concerns. In the following sections, we will analyze and 
compare the two agreements in light of the provision list; analyze the 2008 Agreement in 
light of the provision list; and compare the two agreements to identify the provisions that 
the Central Asian riparians added to improve their relations. We will then examine 
whether the provisions have had significant impact in improving the resiliency of the 
water agreements. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the findings. 
1992 Agreement  
 
 Following the USSR’s break up, the preexisting interdependent economies and 
infrastructure of the Central Asian riparians were left suddenly derailed. The 1992 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and 
                                                     
7 It is important to note methodologically that the agreements analyzed are the English translations. One is 
taken directly from the ICWC website, and the other is sourced from the University of Texas. The Russian 
language versions of the agreements were not evaluated. 
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Conservation of Interstate Sources (hereafter “1992 Agreement”) reflected the need for 
re-established cooperation. The agreement was designed “based on the historical 
community of peoples living on the territory” and “recognizing the unbreakable 
interdependence and relationship of the interests of all the Republics,” in pursuit of an 
“organized solutions of the problems of joint management of water of interstate sources” 
(1992 Agreement). In other words, the riparians recognized that independence was not an 
end to interdependence.  
 The 1992 Agreement has a significant portion of the provision list incorporated 
within its text. The following section will examine the findings from Table 2.1 to discuss 
the implications of provisions present and absent from the agreement.  
Table 2.1. The 1992 Agreement Compared to the Provision List  
1992 Agreement Comparison to Provision List 
Present in Agreement Absent from Agreement 
ID Name 1992 
Article 
ID Name 
SM2 Prioritization of Use Intro., 
Art. 10 
PrE4 Communication Channels 
PsE2 Recognition of Rights Art. 1, 
3, 9 
PrE5 Institutional Learning 
PsM1 Power Balancing Art. 2, 
6, 11 
PrE6 Prior Notice & Consultation  
PrE3 Financial, Technical 
Cooperation  
Art. 4, 9  PsM3 Reframing Value of Water  
PsM2 Population Pressures Art. 4 SE1 Reciprocal Resource Trade  
PsE1 Transparency, Trust-
building 
Art. 5  
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PrM3 Monitoring Art. 5, 8 
PrE1 Intergovernmental 
Institutions  
Art. 7, 9 
PrE2 Vertical, Horizontal 
Integration 
Art. 7 
PrM5 Flexibility Mechanisms Art. 8 
SE2 Environmental 
Considerations 
Art. 10 
SM1 Addressing Hydrologic 
Variability 
Art. 11 
PrM1 Enforcement Art. 12 
PrM2 Dispute Resolution Art. 13 
PrM4 Amendment Art. 14 
 
1992 Agreement Analysis 
 
 There are several aspects of the 1992 Agreement worth highlighting. First, and 
quite noteworthy, is that the first five articles address psychological interests. Articles 1 
and 3 recognize riparians water rights; article 2 balances power; article 4 recognizes 
population pressure; and article 5 attempts to establish transparency for trust. As Moore 
explains, psychological interests are tied to relationships, fears, and aspirations (2003). 
Consider the complex regional influences in Central Asia in 1992—a time of ethnic 
violence, multiple regime changes, civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the breakup 
of the USSR, the rise of religious extremism—and the uncertainty prompting the 
emphasis on psychological interests is self-apparent.  
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 This uncertainty is overwhelmingly evident in the language around water rights; 
references to existing use and equal rights to the interstate resource are frequent. And yet, 
for the riparians at the time of signing, rights were a new concept: prior to the Soviet 
occupation, there had been neither population nor industry great enough to outmatch 
supply, and during occupation water had been a shared resource for the fulfillment of 
Moscow’s imperialist dreams.  
 Second, the articles themselves are overall short and absent of actionable items. 
The longest articles, articles 7 through 10, are each two sentences comprised of about 
eight lines of text. The two shortest articles are 16 and 18 words, respectively—or 
roughly the length of this sentence. The brevity translates to ambiguity. Little consensus 
was likely to be drawn from something as open-ended as article 4, which states: “During 
extremely dry years a special separate decision shall be taken on the problems of water 
supply to the regions of acute water deficiency.” And, in a time of true drought, article 4 
is more likely to exacerbate tensions than relieve it, as its definition provides no structure 
for proper action.  
 Third, and of little surprise, references are absent to climate change and infrequent 
to the environment. The environment is mentioned in the opening remarks, in a reference 
to the “mitigation and stabilization of ecological stresses,” stemming from “water 
resource depletion.” The “rational use and protection” of water is further established in 
article 1, and an expectation for technical cooperation on the problem of the Aral Sea’s 
desiccation is laid out in articles 4 and 10. However, the overall taste of the agreement is 
prioritization of water use that benefits the economic growth and agricultural demands of 
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the region.8 Again, this prioritization reflects the region’s political climate, but also the 
overall philosophy of natural resource use in the Soviet Union and, more broadly, 
throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries. Natural resources, including water, were 
to be consumed, used, and refined in order to create economic benefit.  
 Finally, the psychological emphasis skimmed over two important factors: 
communication and enforcement mechanisms. Communication is implied generically in a 
few articles, such as in article 5 where riparians agree to “facilitate wide information 
exchange,” and in article 7, “having envisaged quarterly meetings.” But the agreement 
lacks robust expectations for how, when, and about what parties will communicate. 
Similarly, enforcement is implied generically in article 12: “The parties agreed to 
elaborate within 1992 the mechanism of economic and such other responsibility for 
violation of the agreed regime and limits of water use.” However, there is no evidence 
whether parties ever agreed upon enforcement measures in the final two months of 
1992—the agreement was signed in September.  
 Combined, this analysis gives context to the times, but also to the articles of 
agreement and the motivations behind them. Equally important, the analysis gives insight 
into why, sixteen years later, the riparians would essentially rewrite the 1992 Agreement 
in plainer, clearer, and better-defined terms.  
 
                                                     
8 See Bullet #1, Bullet #4, Articles 6, 8, and 10 for supporting evidence 
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2008 Agreement  
 
 Following sixteen years of ineffectual water governance in the Aral Sea Basin 
(see Central Asia Conflict Timeline, Appendix A, for details of conflict), the five 
riparians met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to reword their resource relations. The 2008 Statute 
of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (hereafter “2008 
Agreement”) is significantly longer and more robust than the 1992 Agreement, almost 
certainly designed to fill in the holes in operation under the former understanding. The 
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) was originally established in 
1993, and conceptualized within the 1992 Agreement, to manage the allocation of water 
in the Aral Sea Basin. However, the 2008 Agreement significantly reworded the 
relationship between the riparians and the expectations of cooperative management.  
 The 2008 Agreement also has a significant portion of the provision list 
incorporated within its text. The following section will examine the findings from Table 
2.2 to discuss the implications of provisions present and absent from the agreement.  
Table 2.2. The 2008 Agreement Compared to the Provision List  
2008 Agreement Comparison to Provision List 
Present in Agreement Absent in Agreement 
ID Name 2008 Article ID Name 
PrE1 Intergovernmental 
Institutions 
Art. 1.1, 1.2, 
1.3, 1.4, 4.3, 
5.1, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2  
PrM5 Flexibility 
Mechanisms 
PsM3 Reframing Value of 
Water 
Art. 1.5 PsM2 Population Pressure 
SM1 Addressing Art. 2.1, 2.3, PsE2 Recognition of Rights  
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Hydrologic Variability 4.1, 4.2  
PrE2 Vertical, Horizontal 
Integration 
Art. 2.2, 2.11, 
5.2 
 
PrE3 Financial, Technical 
Cooperation  
Art. 2.3, 2.7, 
2.8, 2.9, 2.16, 
2.19, 3.7, 3.8, 
5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 
5.11 
SM2 Prioritization of Use Art. 2.12, 5.5 
SE2 Environmental 
Consideration 
Art. 2.4, 2.5, 
2.13, 5.5 
SE1 Reciprocal Resource 
Trade 
Art. 2.6, 2.12 
PrM1 Enforcement Art. 2.6 
PrM3 Monitoring Art. 2.7, 2.10, 
5.1, 5.6, 5.7 
PsE1 Transparency, Trust-
building 
Art. 2.10, 5.6, 
5.7 
PrE4 Communication 
Channels 
Art. 2.14, 3.2, 
3.3, 3.10, 4.6, 
5.6, 5.7 
PrE5 Institutional Learning Art. 2.15, 5.1, 
5.8 
PrM2 Dispute Resolution  Art. 2.17 
PrE6 Prior Notice & 
Consultation 
Art. 2.18 
PsM1 Power Balancing Art. 3.4, 4.4, 5.4 
PrM4 Amendment 7.1  
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2008 Agreement Analysis 
 
 Like its predecessor, the 2008 Agreement has several noteworthy elements to 
explore. First, and most obvious in analysis, is the remarkable emphasis on financial and 
technical cooperation. Elements of the provision PrE3 were evident in twelve distinct 
clauses across the majority of sections. Compare, for example, clause 2.3, which outlines 
“planning and control of large interstate reservoir operation regimes,” with clause 3.8, 
which designates that the Commission may “[allocate] special interstate investment funds 
for shared financing of work related to regional water sector development.” The 
agreement is overall thorough in its consideration of where, and of what, technical and 
financial collaboration is worthwhile and needed in the region.  
 In stark opposition, the agreement has no references to water rights. The reasons 
for this may be twofold. First, the agreement creates the ICWC according to the 1992 
Agreement, which was very articulate in outlining water rights. It may have been that 
further expression of rights was redundant. Second, the atmosphere at the time of signing 
was polar to that of 1992. Where the former agreement was signed in fear and 
uncertainty, the latter agreement was signed in the momentum of cooperation and 
improvement to the status quo.  
 Unsurprisingly, considering that much of the 2008 Agreement is dedicated to 
revamping and formalizing the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), 
the agreement is heavy on institutional elements required for its operation and growth. 
The agreement has nine clauses specifically addressing its nature as an intergovernmental 
institution, including the majority of the opening section. For example, the first two 
clauses define the role of the ICWC in conjunction with the International Fund for Aral 
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Sea Saving (IFAS), a separate regional water treaty focused primarily on the Aral Sea 
crisis, and the following two clauses define its activity “following the principles of 
collectivity and mutual respect of parties' interests” (Clause 1.4).  
Another interesting component of the 2008 Agreement is its seven clauses for 
communication, in what is likely a direct response to the communication void of the 1992 
Agreement. These clauses range from logistical details like clause 3.10, which establishes 
Russian as the working language, and 4.6, which waives visa requirements for 
individuals travelling for the ICWC, to more facilitative clauses like clause 2.14, which 
establishes a joint program for early warning in emergencies and disasters related to 
hydro-structures.  
 Finally, the 2008 Agreement added reciprocal resource trade in Section Two, 
which outlines the main objectives of the ICWC. Central Asia has attempted—with 
mixed success—to trade energy from downstream riparians for water from upstream 
riparians. Article 2.6 delegates to the ICWC the “preparation of recommendations...on the 
development of uniform pricing policy and possible losses compensation mechanism 
related to shared water and energy use.” In simpler words, this article implies that the 
region would self-police resource trade according the prices and punishments established 
by the ICWC. Article 2.12 states that “reconciliation of releases from reservoirs for 
irrigation needs...with consideration of hydropower generation requirements” is likewise 
a priority objective of the ICWC. Article 2.12 is, essentially, the process-oriented half of 
Article 2.6, which discusses the pricing and legal frameworks of energy and water.  
 The 2008 Agreement was written in a different era than the 1992 Agreement, and 
the tone is reflected in both the political and environmental context of the agreement. The 
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question, however, is whether the 2008 Agreement is truly a more resilient agreement 
than the 1992 Agreement. At first glance, it appears almost certainly superior—the 2008 
Agreement has more substance, more depth to the clauses, and a greater breadth of 
coverage. Yet, in the decade since its conception, conflict has continued to simmer over 
water and water-related issues. Is it truly resilient?  
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Section Three 
 
Oh, I have oft been too anxious for rivers 
To leave it to them to get out of their valleys.  
Robert Frost, “Too Anxious for Rivers” 
 
 
Comparison of the 1992 Agreement and the 2008 Agreement  
 
 A strength of the Central Asia case study is that the differences between the 1992 
and 2008 Agreements allows for tracking the evolution of the riparians’ relations. 
Provisions that were added, removed, or ignored reflect elements that the riparians self-
identified as important and necessary changes. Furthermore, it allows for an apples-to-
apples comparison of basin management before and after changes in the articulation of 
basin management. This will help to clarify the role that provisions play in aiding 
resilient basin management, as well as the future role that provisions can play in 
responding to climate change. 
The following section will identify and weight the significance of changes 
between 1992 and 2008 in three ways. First, a textual analysis will discuss content 
changes in the two agreements. Second, a textual analysis will identify the types of words 
used, changes in the types of words used, and the possible reasons behind changes. Third, 
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by weighting the frequency of words as relative to the word count of the agreements, we 
will identify the relative importance of selected themes to the riparians at the time of 
signing. The three-part analysis will then enlighten a discussion of how much words 
matter in contrast to implementation and riparian relations.  
 
Textual Analysis  
 
 A textual analysis addresses the “content, structure, and functions” of a message, 
or the way that words interact to deliver the purpose of a communication (Frey et al., 
1999). There are four subdivisions to a textual analysis (Frey et al., 1999). Rhetorical 
criticism is the analysis of persuasion in a text; content analysis is the identification of 
characteristics in the text; interaction analysis is the analysis of communication between 
communicators; and performances studies is the identification of the aesthetics of a text. 
The following textual analysis focuses on content analysis, as the study of the messages’ 
characteristics is most relevant to the study of provisions.  
The predominant difference between the 1992 Agreement and the 2008 
Agreement boils down to size. The original agreement is a mere 857 words—not 
including the title and signatories—with 14 articles. The 2008 Agreement, in contrast, is 
a 250% size increase, with 2,138 words—not including the title and signatories—with 
seven sections and 59 clauses [articles]. The size difference directly influences the 
following analyses. Comparing the 1992 Agreement to Provision List (Table 2.1) to the 
2008 Agreement Provision List (Table 2.2) highlights the differences between topics that 
were significant at the time of signing and provisions that are absent from the 
agreements. The following subsections will analyze differences accordingly.  
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Textual Analysis: Topics of Significance 
 
    Though broadly discussed in the individual analyses above, there are four topics 
worth featuring in a side-by-side comparison. These include the types of interests 
emphasized in the two agreements, the two shifts in emphasis, and the additions of 
communication and institutional learning. 
First, there is a definite procedural-interest orientation in the 2008 Agreement, as 
opposed to the psychological-interest orientation in the 1992 Agreement. Take, for 
example, the first six articles of the 1992 Agreement: articles 1 and 3 address recognition 
of rights (PsE2), articles 2 and 6 addresses power balancing (PsM1), article 4 addresses 
population pressures (PsM2), and article 5 addresses transparency and trust-building 
(PsE1). Conversely, the first four clauses [articles] of the 2008 Agreement address 
intergovernmental institutions (PrE1), and then soon thereafter address vertical and 
horizontal integration (prE2) and financial and technical cooperation (PrE3). 
Comparatively, a procedural interest does not come up until article 4 (PrE3) in the 1992 
agreement. In the 2008 agreement, reframing the value of water (PsM3) comes up in 
clause 1.5, but otherwise psychological interests are absent until transparency and trust-
building in clause 2.10. Thus, the emphasis on procedural elements represents a shift in 
the content of the 2008 and 1992 Agreements.  
Second, the 2008 Agreement underscores a financial and technical cooperation 
(PrE3) only implied in the 1992 Agreement. There are 12 clauses in the 2008 Agreement 
that mention interstate technical and/or financial cooperation—nearly as many articles as 
comprised the 1992 Agreement. Conversely, there are only two articles in the 1992 
Agreement regarding technical and financial cooperation. The cooperative motivations 
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that cause the psychological-to- procedural reorientation may have also influenced this 
shift. The first agreement is focused on water rights, water allocation, and water use, all 
of which are internally-oriented foci for the benefit of the fledgling nation-states. The 
second agreement is more outward-oriented, with language reflecting the shared and 
interdependent relationship between riparians. Cooperation is naturally a theme that 
accompanies an outward orientation. 
Third, the 2008 Agreement shifts much more towards consideration of the 
environment than the 1992 Agreement. This is of little surprise, considering that climate 
change and environmentalism had begun to plant deep roots in the upper echelons of 
global governance by the mid-2000, emerging in rhetoric at the highest levels. In the 
1992 Agreement, mentions of the environment or ecosystems are directly or implicitly 
linked to economic and social advantages. In the 2008 Agreement, the frequency of 
mentions and the tone towards the topic changes to reflect the looming environmental 
crisis of Central Asia. That being said, the provisions within the 2008 Agreement are not 
specifically framed as a response to the environment, but rather as conscientious of the 
environment.  
Fourth, the riparians added communication channels and institutional learning 
elements to the 2008 Agreement, in contrast to the brevity of the 1992 Agreement. The 
2008 Agreement has seven clauses regarding communication, compared to zero in the 
1992 Agreement, and three regarding institutional learning, compared to zero in the 1992 
Agreement. The changes reflect what was likely the actual situation, in which 
communication and feedback-loops organically developed through trial and error. For 
example, consider the clause establishing Russian as the working language of the ICWC. 
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There is no language outlined in the 1992 Agreement, likely because former working 
relations had been determined by the greater Russified framework of the USSR. When 
the next generation of officials rose into the ICWC, however, they brought with them 
new frameworks of national identity and linguistic differences; hence, a language clause 
was necessary for framing the communication of the ICWC.  
 
Textual Analysis: Overlooked Provisions 
 
    What is present in the texts is only half the picture; just as important to 
understanding and evaluating the agreements is what is absent. Absent text can imply 
intentionality, subconscious dispositions, accidental overlooks, or ignorance towards the 
importance of a clause. However, what was most surprising during the analysis of the 
1992 and 2008 Agreements was that no provision from the provision list was entirely 
overlooked. Though a handful of provisions were left off of each agreement, the entire 
list is represented between both agreements. Therefore, this section analyzes “overlooked 
provisions” to be areas where provisions are too weak to improve resiliency.  
    The first of these overlooked provisions is enforcement. Clause 2.6 in the 2008 
Agreement says that the ICWC will prepare “possible losses compensation mechanisms” 
for shared water use, suggesting that a noncompliant riparian would be obligated to 
compensate the injured riparian for losses. Likewise, article 12 in the 1992 Agreement 
says that the parties commit to create a “mechanism of economic and such other 
responsibility for the violation of the agreed regime and limits,” but there is no formal 
agreement indicating that any such mechanism was created. The textual hints of 
81 
 
 
enforcement suggest that the Central Asian states understand its importance, but are 
unwilling politically and sovereignly to commit to the risk that accompanies enforcement. 
Flexibility is also weakly represented within the agreements. The sole flexibility 
mechanism is in article 8 of the 1992 Agreement, which says the future ICWC will 
annually evaluate water use limits and actual water availability in order to allow for 
adaptation, or “correction,” at the water reservoirs, allowing some degree for 
implementing short-term adaptations. This sole provision underscores the weakness of 
flexibility in the agreements for two reasons: first, the flexibility mechanism is solely 
limited to adapting water allocation from water reservoirs; second, the flexibility is 
limited to the seasonality of water releases, thereby limiting year-round flexibility. Even 
more unfortunate is the flexibility within the 2008 Agreement. Though there is emphasis 
on collaboration, cooperation, and coordination, the new agreement has no mention of a 
mechanism specifically for adapting to unforeseen circumstances. This arrangement, 
especially when compared to the U.S.-Mexico minutes process, in which riparians can 
create self-governing provisions as needed, or when compared to the literature on the 
need for flexibility in basin management, limits innovative adaptability in Central Asia. 
    Third, and alarming through the lens of resiliency, are the weak dispute resolution 
mechanisms expressed in both agreements. Article 13 of the 1992 Agreement delegates 
“all disputable matters” to the heads of the water agencies for resolution. Similarly, 
clause 2.17 of the 2008 Agreement delegates “disputes and disagreements” for 
“investigation” to the ICWC, with conflict escalation vaguely assigned to “a special 
commission to establish facts, as well as setting procedures for liabilities.” Taken 
together, the contradictory dispute resolution mechanisms are even less coherent. 
82 
 
 
 Syntactical Analysis 
 
The syntactical analysis analyzed specific units of the messaging through a focus 
on words and word choice (Frey et al., 1999). The hypothesis of the analysis was that the 
frequency of words used in each of the agreements would reveal differences in the 
ultimate purpose of the respective documents (this hypothesis is further expanded in the 
following section, in which words are weighted according to the length of the document 
by percentage). A list of fifty words, each with connotations identified as relevant to the 
provision list, were compared. The selected words have enhancement, mitigation, 
procedural, psychological, substantive, or resiliency connotations, and include nouns, 
adjectives, and verbs. 
The methodology of this analysis began with using translations directly from the 
ICWC site.9 These translations were not the translations used in the textual and thematic 
analyses above, but were selected under the assumption that the ICWC translators have 
similar communication goals and may have utilized similar words. To balance vocabulary 
differences, however, the author identified and paired synonyms together (i.e. Shared and 
Joint) to better represent both agreements. Additionally, the words within the ICWC—
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination—were excluded from word counts when 
within the name of the ICWC.  
The findings speak to the character differences of the agreements. In the chart 
below (See Table 2.3), word findings of significance are highlighted: shared / joint, 
international, interstate, shall / will / must, environmental / ecological, flexible / 
                                                     
9 See: http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm; http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute1.htm 
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flexibility, law / legal, economic, develop-(-ment, -ed, -ing, -s), information, improv-(-
ement, -ed, -ing, -es), rational use / quotas. These words were highlighted because of 
their connotations to the content of the agreement or because of their frequency. 
Shared / Joint: This pairing is noteworthy because it shows the dramatic shift in 
expectations from the riparians. The 1992 Agreement used the terms a total of 6 times, 
whereas the 2008 Agreement used the pairing 24 times. This underscores the analysis that 
the 1992 Agreement was inward-focused, and the 2008 Agreement was outward focused. 
International / Interstate: The use of these words also shifts dramatically between 
the two agreements. The pair are employed 19 times in the 2008 Agreement, versus only 
4 uses of interstate in the 1992 Agreement. Like shared and joint, the use of international 
and interstate reflects the outward momentum of the 2008 Agreement. 
Shall / Will / Must: The writing style employed by each agreement framed 
expectations of riparians through differing strength of language. In the 1992 Agreement, 
the words shall, will, and must were used 11 times, whereas “will” was used only once in 
the 2008 Agreement. Instead, the 2008 Agreement framed the expectations of the ICWC 
through various verb usage, which gives a softer tone overall to the document. 
Environmental / Ecological: Mirroring many of the findings above, the use of 
environmental and ecological was higher in the 2008 Agreement than the 1992 
Agreement. This also reinforces the textual analysis above that the global political sphere 
was much more contentious of environmental impacts in 2008 than in the 1990s.  
Flexible / Flexibility: The observation that neither agreement employed the term 
flexible or flexibility, including synonyms, represents a concerning trend in Central Asian 
water management. Mechanisms for flexibility are critical to regional resiliency. 
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Law / Legal: The 2008 Agreement used law and legal 4 times, whereas the 1992 
Agreement never did. This may reflect an interest in engaging with outside standards and 
organizations—the outward orientation—that as absent in negotiations in the 1990s. It 
also employs an external standard as a means of determining fairness. 
Economic: Both agreements used the term economic with relative frequency: 5 
uses in the 2008 Agreement, and 6 uses in the 1992 Agreement. The frequency reflects 
the national priorities, identified in the preamble of the 1992 Agreement, of growing their 
economies, raising the standard of living, building up infrastructure for development, and 
improving overall GDP. Regional development has improved in the past quarter century, 
as exemplified by GDP changes, but not at a universal rate.  
Information / Scientific / Monitor / Research / Facts: These five terms are paired 
together because of the connotations that accompany them, connotations of truth-finding 
and transparency. The group was employed 14 times in the 2008 Agreement, but only 4 
times in the 1992 Agreement. The implications are that Central Asian riparians believe 
scientifically-grounded evidence is a fair standard upon which to make decisions. 
Develop- / Improve-: These verbs represent forward momentum, continuous 
engagement, and critical consideration of process. To develop and improve requires 
cooperation and communication when things go well and when things go poorly. It 
should be of little surprise, then, that the words were used 22 times in the 2008 
Agreement and 0 times in the 1992 Agreement. It is a stark example of the limited scope 
in 1992, as well as the positivity in 2008. 
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Table 2.3 Syntactical Analysis of Selected Words in 2008 and 1992 Agreements  
Syntactical Analysis of 2008 and 1992 Agreements 
Word/s # in 
2008 
# in 
1992 
Word/s # in 
2008 
# in 
1992 
Shared / Joint 18 / 6 1 / 5 Rights 1 3 
International 9 0 Interstate 10 4 
Protection 6 6 Rational Use 0 4 
Equal / Parity 1 / 0 2 / 2 Equitable 2 1 
Proportion- 1 0 Ensure 4 3 
Cooperation 2 0 Respect- 1 1 
Shall / Will / 
Must 
0 / 1 / 0 8 / 2 / 1 Water 66 47 
Management 10 3 Responsibility 2 1 
Releases 7 3 Together 5 1 
Problems / 
Issues 
2 / 2 2 / 2 Mitigate 0 1 
Environmental 4 0 Ecological 2 1 
Allocation 2 3 Flexible / 
Flexibility 
0 0 
Dispute 1 1 Users 3 1 
Compliance 0 1 Law- / Legal 1 / 3 0 
Economic 5 6 Stabilize 0 1 
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Liability 0 1 Coordinat- 6 3 
Social 1 0 Establish (verb) 4 1 
Established 
(adj.) 
3 3 Develop- 15 0 
Facts 1 0 Policy / Rules 5 / 0 2 / 1 
Scientific 4 2 Research 3 1 
Information 5 1 Monitor 1 0 
Improve- 7 0 Strict- 0 2 
Use 17 14 Regulation 2 2 
Control 4 1 Interests / Needs 1 / 3 3 / 1 
Integrate- 1 2 Quotas 0 4 
  
Scaled Word Frequency 
 
My analytical hypothesis purported that analyzing the frequency of words in each 
of the documents would reveal differences in the purpose of the respective documents, by 
examining actual versus relative use of certain words. While the syntactical analysis 
revealed insight into the changes between the documents, conclusions about the purpose 
of the documents are implicit. This final analysis scales word use to word count, to give a 
proportionate picture of how frequent a word was in comparison to the overall amount of 
words within each document. The methodology was drawn from frequency analysis, 
which studies the frequency of words and phrases within a given context. To scale the 
usage, the frequency of the word was divided by the agreement word count, and then 
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multiplied by 1000 to give a full number. So, for example, if “word” has been used eight 
times in this paragraph of 135 words, then the actual frequency is 0.059%. Multiplied by 
1000, that percentage changes to 59.2, which is easier for comparison. 
The scaled list is comprised of key words from the syntactical analysis above, but 
reframes their comparative significance (see Table 2.4). Take, for example, the use of the 
word “interstate.” The 2008 Agreement uses the word 10 times, and the 1992 Agreement 
uses the word 4 times. However, when the frequency is divided by the overall word 
count, the scaled frequency of the word is equal. The 2008 Agreement employed it more 
in actual terms, but not in relative terms. Similarly, consider the use of the word 
“economic.” It was used 5 times in the 2008 Agreement and 6 times in the 1992 
Agreement. The scaled use, however, implies that the word was much more important in 
the 1992 Agreement, as it is three times more frequent in relative terms. Finally, the use 
of shared and joint is not as imbalanced as the syntactical analysis first suggests. Though 
much more frequent in actual terms in the 2008 Agreement, when scaled to consider 
overall word count, it is only 1.6x more frequent in relative terms than the 1992 
Agreement. 
The implications of scaled word frequency raise new questions about the 
significance of wording. Does content matter as much as intent? Does content matter as 
much mechanisms for amending or adding content? Does the length of an agreement, 
instead of word choice, increase the likelihood of an agreement’s success? 
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Table 2.4 Scaled Frequency of Word Use for Comparison between Agreements 
Word/s 2008 Use 
Scaled 
1992 Use 
Scaled 
Comparative Frequency 
Shared / Joint 11.2 7 1.6x more frequent in 2008 
International 4.2 0 - 
Interstate 4.7 4.7 Equal 
Shall / Will / Must 0.5 12.8 25.6x more frequent in 1992 
Environmental 1.9 0 - 
Law / Legal 1.9 0 - 
Economic 2.3 7 3x more frequent in 1992 
Develop- 7 0 - 
Information 2.3 1.2 1.9x more frequent in 2008 
Improve- 3.3 0 - 
  
Analyses Discussion  
 
 The following three sections will probe deeper into the implications and 
discussions stemming from the analyses. The first section will overview expected and 
unexpected findings, to raise the question of whether provisions are significant to a 
treaty’s success. The second section will specifically address whether the provisions 
impacted the resiliency of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements. The third and final section will 
more broadly discuss the problems and constraints of the analysis and the hypothesis.  
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Analyses Discussion: Expected and Unexpected Findings  
 
 The analysis of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements highlighted findings both 
expected and unexpected. On one hand, the agreements reflected expected changes in 
size and tone. Regarding size, it is of little surprise that the 2008 Agreement was larger 
and more robust than its predecessor. Had the 1992 Agreement been sufficient, there 
would have been no need for an updated agreement, as the 1992 Agreement’s amendment 
mechanism would have been appropriate for minor changes in governance. Therefore, the 
size increase of the 2008 Agreement is a logical finding. Regarding tone, the historical 
context of the 1992 Agreement established the expected tone, as extreme and volatile 
shifts in governance and infrastructure impacted the inward-focus of negotiators. The 
2008 Agreement, conversely, was created in a time of relative regional stability.  
 In terms of unexpected findings, the breadth of provisions and the relative 
frequency of words illumined the surprising and complex nature of agreement creation. 
First, it was surprising that the full breadth of the provision list was incorporated within 
the two agreements. The weight of this finding will be discussed in the next section, to 
determine whether the inclusion of the provisions has direct impact the resiliency of the 
agreement. Second, the relative frequency of words, versus the actual frequency of 
words, was surprising. Throughout the early stages of the analysis, it was easy to assume 
that the findings would support the superiority of the 2008 Agreement. However, the 
relative frequency of words suggested that the 1992 Agreement prioritized many themes 
as much, and even more, than the 2008 Agreement.  
 However, the most significant extraction from the analysis is the implication that 
the content of an agreement matters less than its implementation. Though logical, the 
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underlying assumption has been that content determines the success of an agreement—
that the right provisions will determine the resiliency of an agreement. If the treaties 
combined included the entirety of the provision list, and if the treaties independently 
included the majority of the provision list, then why is Central Asia a hotbed of latent 
water conflict? The next section will continue this discussion, with a deeper examination 
of the impact of provisions on resiliency and a discussion of how success in this case 
study is measured.  
 
Analyses Discussion: Did the Provisions Impact the Resiliency of the Agreements? 
 
   The agreement analyses raised a distressing question about the impact of 
provisions, and even content more generally, on the success of an agreement. In this 
context, the goal is resiliency to climate change impacts and success is the measured 
ability of a basin’s management structures to withstand negative trajectories. In 
evaluating the impact of provisions on the resiliency of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements, 
the success of the Central Asian case study is surmised implicitly and defined explicitly. 
Implicit success is determined through content trends in literature, media, and NGOs, and 
their opinions on Central Asian water conflict and management. Explicit success is 
determined by comparing factors of Central Asia to indicators of resiliency (Crow, 2018). 
Unfortunately, the findings from both suggest that success in Central Asia is far from a 
benchmark for provisions.  
In the 25 years that Central Asia has managed its water resources through 
agreements and the ICWC, a large body of literature has remarked on its overall 
inefficiencies. In 2008—prior to the 2008 Agreement—Beatrice Mosello wrote, “The 
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imposition of a half-hearted version of Soviet central planning on the fractious Central 
Asian states has not proven a recipe for success” (2008, 161). Mosello later quotes the 
International Crisis Group, who in 2002 complained that the ICWC was “a club for water 
officials that makes no real decisions” (ICG, 2002, 9, qtd in B. Mosello, 2008, 162). 
Among other concerns, Mosello underscores issues with the pre-2008 ICWC such as its 
possible bias stemming from its headquarters in Uzbekistan, its weak institutional 
capacity and technical expertise, its limited budget,10 and the “state of paralysis” drawn 
from its consensus-based authority (2008, 163). 
   More recent articles continue to reiterate the shortcomings of the ICWC and basin 
management in Central Asia overall. An article by Yegor Volovik for the UNDP in 2011 
identified six major gaps in regional agreements. His report reads similarly to the 
comparative analysis on the 1992 and 2008 Agreements above, identifying gaps in 
monitoring and evaluation, climate change issues, information exchanges, enforcement 
mechanisms, the water-energy dilemma for upstream riparians, and, most tellingly, a 
“regional cooperation and coordination platform” (Volovik, 2011, 23). Volovik writes, 
“There have been some attempts...to establish a cooperation/coordination platform to 
discuss water related issues but they have not materialized in effective legislative, 
institutional, and economic means for cooperation” (2011, 23). The question stemming 
directly from Volovik’s analysis is what—if not a cooperation/coordination platform—is 
the ICWC? And if nothing effective has materialized, then why has the ICWC failed in 
                                                     
10 Mosello writes that only Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan fulfill their financial obligations. 
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its mandate “to deal with joint solution of issues related to shared water management”? 
(2008 Agreement). 
 Success can also be measured through factors associated with community 
resiliency (Crow, 2018, see Table 2.5). These factors include infrastructure and services, 
community competence and agency, equal access to resources, values and beliefs that 
benefit the overall community, and governance. The theory is that these factors are both 
indicators and impetus for resiliency; if a system has a strong representation of these 
factors, then it is more resilient. However, when these categories are placed beside the 
Central Asia case study for comparison, it is evident that resiliency is not a guiding 
concept in water management. 
Table 2.5. Factors Associated with Community Resiliency (Source: Crow, 2018) 
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For example, resiliency has been tied to well-functioning infrastructure and 
services (Buikstra et al., 2010, see  Table 2.5). Yet, as discussed in the conflict analysis 
above, the crumbling infrastructure installed by the Soviet Union loses up to half of all 
irrigation water in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov, 2017) and is serviced by a weak network of 
water user associations (Anarbekov and Mukhamedova, 2017, 16). Similarly, equal 
access to resources is a factor in resiliency (Magis, 2010; see  Table 2.5). Yet, the weak 
infrastructure and embroiled tensions of ethnicity in the Ferghana Valley create real and 
perceived horizontal inequalities between groups (Kreutzmann, 2016). 
Community competence and agency—meaning the existing ability of a 
community to collaborate in flexible and innovative ways for mutual gain—is another 
factor associated with resiliency (Norris et al., 2008, see  Table 2.5). In Central Asian 
border communities, however, communities have frequently forsaken collaboration for 
conflict escalation, including frequent violence (see Appendix A for a timeline of Central 
Asian water conflict). Similarly, another factor for resiliency is community values and 
beliefs, or the norms that promote community wellbeing (Kulig, Hegney, and Edge, 
2010, see  Table 2.5). The historical quarrels amidst border communities, however, point 
to weak or nonexistent resiliency in the Aral Sea Basin. 
Finally, multiple authors (Gooch et al., 2010; Kulig et al., 2013; Matarrita-
Cascante and Trejos, 2013; Maclean et al., 2014; see  Table 2.5) underscore the 
importance of governance and local institutional arrangements in determining resiliency. 
Resilient governance is defined as “robust, responsive, and adaptive” (Crow, 2018, 
emphasis added). Yet, these adjectives are rare, if not wholly absent, from discussions on 
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Central Asia’s water governance. On the contrary, the system has been described as 
“legal nihilism” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030).  
    The implication of this discussion is that the provisions failed to provide 
resiliency in the 1992 and 2008 Agreements. The analysis implies that even when the 
content of an agreement satisfies the provisions identified in the literature, the 
implementation of the agreement—or lack thereof—may rupture the momentum of 
cooperation, flexibility, stability, and other factors foundational to resiliency, which were 
established in the treaty’s language through provisions. In other words, implementation is 
conditional for the success of provisions. Now the question is, if the perfect agreement is 
insufficient for creating climate change resiliency, what will? 
 
Analyses Discussion: Discussion of Provisions and Research  
 
 The research behind provisions and the case study were thorough but far from 
comprehensive, leaving space for critique within the findings and outcomes, and also for 
areas of future research. First, provisions raise potential questions about their 
interconnected nature, relevance to vertical tiers of governance, and completeness. 
Second, the case study did not consider the influence of major external pressures, power 
between riparians, or the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism in its conclusion 
that provisions failed to provide resiliency. And finally, the inclusion of implementation 
as a provision was not considered until the conclusion of the analyses.  
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Provisions  
 
 Regarding provisions, the interconnected nature of provisions was not considered 
in the analysis of the agreements’ effectiveness. For example, Keohane and Martin 
(1995) argued that enforcement should be coupled with monitoring to be more effective 
(qtd. in Greet et al., 2013). There may be strong connections between certain provisions 
that negate or minimize the impact if not paired together. If so, weak basin management 
may be tied to the combinations of content in the agreements, which would undermine 
the above conclusion that implementation is conditional for the success of provisions. 
Further research is needed to determine whether the provision list should be reformed 
into a provision network, with linked provisions critical to the one another’s success.  
 Provisions were also assumed to be universal within a basin. The case study did 
not consider that some provisions may be more relevant at different tiers of governance. 
If vertical integration extends from the United Nations to the household, then it is logical 
to assume that some provisions will have more or less relevance along the continuum of 
governance. As such, further research is needed in identifying the impact of provisions 
within vertical integration.  
 Additionally, an assumption in applying the provision list to the case study was 
that the provision list is complete, fully representing the substantive, psychological, and 
procedural needs of parties. It is possible that the provision list is incomplete. If so, the 
Central Asian case study may have significant holes in its 1992 and 2008 Agreements, 
which could explain its poor record of water management.  
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Case Study  
 
 Regarding the case study, there are two potential weaknesses in the analysis and 
conclusion. First, the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism was identified, but no 
conclusion was drawn that determined whether or not enforcement is critical to the 
success of an agreement. Further research is needed on the significance of enforcement 
and its relationship to compliance. Assuming that enforcement is a critical provision, it 
may explain why Central Asia has weak implementation of water governance.  
 Second, the case study did not consider the element of power in riparian 
interactions. In the US-Mexico Commission, for example, stability in the flexibility 
mechanism may be due to the huge power imbalance – the US, as both the upstream 
riparian and the global hegemon, dwarfs the capabilities and desire of Mexico to disrupt 
cooperation. In Central Asia, on the other hand, the upstream riparians are Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, both of whom are poorer and smaller than downstream riparians 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The latter riparians have large export-economies in oil and 
cotton, respectively, with GDPs well above those of the former riparians. Some authors 
have addressed the influence of power in shared basins (see Lee and Mitchell, 2010), but 
more research is needed in identifying how provisions and/or implementation are 
impacted by various power arrangements.    
Third, the case study did not consider two external pressures on the water 
agreements. First, Afghanistan is an upstream riparian who is absent from 1992 and 2008 
Agreements, despite having potentially significant impact on water flows and allocation. 
Afghanistan was typically not included in the literature on Central Asian water 
governance, though regularly identified as a potential issue. Further research is needed on 
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the impact of Afghan water use on Central Asian water agreements. Second, the case 
study did not address the pressure of water infrastructure in context of the 1992 and 2008 
Agreements. Infrastructure was thoroughly discussed in the conflict analysis, but only 
discussed in generic terms of “development” within the agreements. More research is 
needed to determine whether a provision addressing specific regional problems, such as 
infrastructure in Central Asia, would positively impact the success of an agreement.  
 
Implementation  
 
From the case study analyses, implementation was identified as the likely cause of 
Central Asian governance issues. As such, provisions guiding the implementation of an 
agreement were not considered until after the research was complete. Such provisions 
could have included research into mechanisms for jump-starting cooperation. Further 
research is needed in determining whether a provision can directly influence the 
implementation of the agreement, which could then influence the resiliency of a basin, or 
whether implementation is inherently separate from, though dependent upon, an 
agreement. If so, there may be additional procedural provisions to guide riparians in 
ensuring that their agreement is implemented in a resilient manner resiliently.  
 
Analyses Discussion: Conclusion  
 
The preceding three sections examined the expected and unexpected findings, 
determined that provisions failed to provide resiliency in the greater Aral Sea Basin, and 
identified areas for further exploration pertaining to provisions, the case study, and 
implementation. Overall, the conclusion is that expectations for provisions did not align 
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with the findings of the research: the provision list was well represented between the 
1992 and 2008 Agreements, yet failed to provide resiliency in Central Asian water 
governance. Though there are possible critiques of the research, the outcome presented is 
that implementation is as important, if not more important, to resiliency than treaty 
content.  
 
Rejected Hypothesis 
  
 The findings from the analysis of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements strongly suggest 
that the hypothesis, which tied provisions to climate change resiliency, is rejected. The 
provision list purported that the provisions would improve basin management despite 
culture, geography, and political structures, and, when used in the majority, would 
increase the resiliency of an agreement to withstand climate change. The hypothesis 
further outlined resiliency theory as a worthwhile goal because of its positive 
reorientation of climate change impacts.  
 However, in response to the elements of the hypothesis, the provision list has not 
appeared to improve basin management in Central Asia. There is no reason to believe 
that the provision list has harmed basin management, but it is evident that the impact of 
the provision list is contingent upon successful implementation of an agreement. 
Additionally, the entire provision list was represented between the two agreements, yet 
the provision list did not appear to increase the resiliency of the agreements to withstand 
climate change. Again, there is little reason to believe that the provision list negatively 
impacted the resiliency of the agreements, but there is only fractured evidence that the 
greater Aral Sea Basin is more resilient because of the provisions. So, to return to the 
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question raised at the end of the Mexico-U.S. flexibility mechanism discussion, what is 
the balance between articulating the perfect agreement and implementing resilient, 
productive basin management?  
 
Conclusion  
 
 There is little doubt that giant rifts in international treaties are coming: climate 
change will impact preexisting water agreements as it forces changes in the hydrologic 
cycle. Such shifts threaten to bring increased conflict over shared resources, as riparians 
fail to adapt to new water circumstances. Addressing these eventualities will require 
resiliency within transboundary water agreements. Yet, how to promote climate change 
resiliency remains vague, at best.  
 The assumption that incorporating a specific array of provisions within a water 
agreement to create mechanisms for adapting to climate change is not uncommon. This 
thesis began by extracting provisions from the literature to propose a comprehensive 
provision list, comprised of twenty provisions for enhancing cooperation and mitigating 
conflict in a way that addressed the procedural, psychological, and substantive interests 
of riparians. The hypothesis was that this provision list, when included in a water 
agreement, would ensure climate change resiliency. However, the conclusion is that 
provisions may promote resiliency, but do not ensure resiliency.  
 When the provision list was applied to the case study, this hypothesis was 
rejected. The case study considered two of Central Asia’s water agreements, one from 
1992 and the other from 2008. Central Asia is a region shaped by latent water conflict 
stemming from historical legacies and horizontal inequalities, and also faces severe 
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climate change impacts due to its glacier-fed rivers. Through textual, syntactical, and 
frequency analyses, the agreements revealed that the provision list is, overall, represented 
in the two agreements. This prompted questions about the significance of the provision 
list, and whether implementation of an agreement is more relevant to climate change 
resiliency than the content of an agreement.  
 The initial hypothesis that climate change provisions promote resiliency was 
ultimately rejected. Instead, two new questions were raised for future consideration. First, 
what is the balance between articulating the perfect agreement and implementing 
resilient, productive basin management? And, similarly, if the perfect agreement is 
insufficient for creating climate change resiliency, what will?   
 To conclude, the importance of promoting strong, resilient agreements for 
withstanding the pressures of climate change cannot be understated. As writer James 
Cascio articulated, “Foresight turns out to be a critical adaptive strategy for times of great 
stress” (Cascio, n.d.). Irrespective of how resiliency is implemented within water 
governance, the intentionality to thrive despite the pressures of climate change provides a 
forward-orientation for designing and guiding water agreements.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A  
 
Timeline Highlighting Water Conflict in Central Asia  
 
The Pacific Institute Water Conflict Chronology Timeline gives a picture of water 
conflict and violence in Central Asia since the 1990s (World Water).  
● The first record of violence over water was in the Ferghana Valley, in 1990, 
which led to the death of 300 people on the Kyrgyz and Uzbek border.  
● In 1997, 130,000 Uzbekistani troops guarded reservoirs between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan cuts off 70% of water flowing to 
Kazakhstan, which instigates a riot by Kazakh farmers.  
● In 1999, Tajikistan flooded water from the Kairakum reservoir without giving 
notice or consultation, in a move that resulted in significant cotton losses to 
Kazakhstan farmers.  
● In 1999, Kyrgyzstan halted flows to Kazakhstan for its failure to reciprocate coal 
for water, as laid out in a previous agreement. A year later, in 2000, Uzbekistan 
also cut off water to Kazakhstan for non-payment of debt.  
● In 2001, Kyrgyzstan declares water a commodity and began charging its 
downstream riparians for water. Reciprocally, Uzbekistan halts all natural gas 
deliveries for Kyrgyzstan’s failure to comply with its reciprocal resource trade.  
● In 2008, border disputations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lead to water 
conflicts along the border. Tajik villagers crossed into a Kyrgyz district to remove 
a dam, which later resulted in Kyrgyzstan blocking irrigation water to Tajikistan 
in the growing season.  
● In 2012, escalatory rhetoric over the proposal of dams in Central Asia heightens 
discord over water. The Kambarata-1 dam in Kyrgyzstan and the Rogun Dam in 
Tajikistan would impact water supplies for the downstream riparians. 
Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov threatens that the dams could escalate 
relations into wars, and resultantly cuts off natural gas deliveries to Tajikistan.  
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● In 2013, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have a water dispute between villagers, in 
which Kyrgyz villagers blocked irrigation water flowing to Kazakh farmers.  
● In 2014, border forces from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were injured over a 
dispute regarding a small dam and electricity substation.  
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Appendix B 
 
The 2008 and 1992 Agreements 
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia, 2008, and the 
Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and Conservation of 
Interstate Sources, 1992, are attached for consultation of the agreements in the English 
translation.  
 
Statute of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia  
 
1.1. The Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia (ICWC) is created by 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan according to Agreement on co-operation in 
shared management of international water resources use and protection adopted by Heads 
of State on 18th February 1992 in Almaty. 
1.2. By the decision of the Heads of State of Central Asia of March 26, 1992 and April 9, 
1999 and the decision of IFAS Board of March 27, 2004, ICWC and its executive bodies 
are annexed to the International Fund for Aral Sea Saving (IFAS) and rank as 
international organizations. 
1.3. ICWC in its activity is led by bi- and multilateral agreements between the State-
Founders on water resources use from interstate sources, by Decisions of IFAS Board and 
by the present Statute. 
1.4. ICWC is a regional body of the Central Asian states to deal with joint solution of 
issues related to shared water management, effective use and protection in the Aral Sea 
basin and to implement of commonly elaborated programs following the principles of 
collectivity and mutual respect of parties’ interests. 
1.5. ICWC and its executive bodies implement a set of measures and procedures ensuring 
equitable water allocation along the interstate sources, taking into account nature needs 
and future development. 
1.6. Any other state may join ICWC as a member or an observer upon consent of the 
Governments of State-Founders. 
II. Main objectives 
 
The main objectives of ICWC are as follows: 
2.1. Elaboration and implementation of a regional policy of efficient shared water use and 
protection in order to meet social, economic and environmental needs of the State-
Founders on equitable basis, as well as development and implementation of joint 
programs for water supply improvement in shared basins in the region. 
2.2. Shared water management in the Aral Sea basin by applying IWRM principles. 
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2.3. Elaboration and approval of annual limits of water withdrawals from shared sources 
for State-Founders and supervision over their observance; planning and control of large 
interstate reservoirs operation regimes, water allocation management under actual flow 
probability and water-economic situation. 
2.4. Ensure annual releases for environmental protection and the Aral Sea and sanitary 
releases along canals. 
2.5. Development and implementation together with ICSD of regional environmental 
programs related to the Aral Sea desiccation and water sources exhausting, including 
catchment zone and wetlands. 
2.6. Preparation of recommendations to the Governments of State-Founders on the 
development of uniform pricing policy and possible losses compensation mechanisms 
related to shared water and energy use, as well as on legal framework of shared water 
use. 
2.7. Coordination and control over implementation of joint research aimed at scientific 
and engineering solution of regional water-related problems and of regional projects, with 
the use of available scientific capacities of the State-Founders and implementation of the 
results achieved. 
2.8. Preparation of projects and initiation of work on improvement of active international 
agreements in area of shared water management. 
2.9. Render assistance to the Governments of State-Founders in cooperation with 
international organizations and institutes. 
2.10. Development and operation of unified regional, basin and national information 
systems on water use, on dissemination and exchange of information related to water 
resources and their use by the State-Founders. 
2.11. Facilitation and coordination of relationships between the regional, national water 
organizations and the regional, national hydrometeorological services; initiation of 
regional programs and works on the improvement of monitoring system and hydrometric 
provision. 
2.12. Reconciliation of releases from reservoirs for irrigation needs with the Coordination 
Dispatch Center “Energy”, with consideration of hydropower generation requirements, as 
well as coordination of actions with national ministries and departments of Central Asia - 
electric energy producers. 
2.13. Facilitation of corporate affairs in developing and implementing water-conservation 
technologies, advanced irrigation methods and technique, modern facilities for water 
measurement and automation, in designing and developing general metrological system, 
and accrediting metrological services and in other measures promoting better water use. 
2.14. Elaboration of joint programs for prevention, early warning and liquidation of 
consequences from emergencies and disasters related to operation of interstate 
hydrostructures. 
2.15. Establishment and development of a training system at national and regional levels 
in order to increase skills of water-management organizations’ staff and of water users. 
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2.16. Strengthen financial, material-technical and legal bases and scientific and 
technological capacities of ICWC executive bodies. 
2.17. Investigation of disputes and disagreements between shared water users; if 
necessary, development of a procedure for creation of a special commission to establish 
facts, as well as setting procedures for liabilities. 
2.18. Investigation of notification by one of the Parties about construction of new water 
structures impacting water regimes in shared waterways. 
2.19. Elaboration of country proposals on construction, reconstruction and operation of 
interstate water structures, with cost sharing among the Parties. 
 
III. Structure and organizing the activities 
3.1. ICWC members are comprised of leaders of national water ministries or departments 
of State-Founders or of authorized representatives of country Governments. 
3.2. ICWC meetings are held on a quarterly basis, by turns in each of State-Founders 
under chairmanship of ICWC member of the respective state. The host-country bears 
responsibility for timely approval of meeting dates and submission of agreed agenda to 
ICWC members by executive bodies in due time. 
3.3. Extraordinary ICWC meeting can be held upon initiative and with agreement of the 
Parties. 
3.4. ICWC’s decisions are made on consensus basis. 
3.5. ICWC may make “Protocolar decision” on individual questions. 
3.6. ICWC members, leaders of ICWC executive bodies and of international 
organizations who have made considerable contribution to ICWC activities, would be 
awarded a title of “ICWC Honorary Member” and a breastplate of standard form. The 
ICWC Honorary members can participate in ICWC meeting and have a right of advisory 
vote. 
3.7. ICWC establishes its executive bodies for fulfillment of set tasks and provides 
financing of their activities, as well as of approved programs and measures at expense of 
State-Founders and, if necessary, changes duties of the executive bodies or ceases their 
activities. 
3.8. ICWC may crease special interstate investment funds for shared financing of work 
related to regional water sector development and for fulfillment of other tasks as 
mentioned in given Statute. 
3.9. The costs of ICWC meetings on the spot are covered by the host-country. 
3.10. The working language of ICWC is Russian. 
 
IV. Rights and obligations 
4.1. Annually ICWC approves water-withdrawal limits from shared water sources (for a 
hydrological year with division into growing and non-growing periods) for State-
Founders, with consideration of foreseen flow probability and established releases to the 
Aral Sea and river deltas. ICWC makes decisions on water-withdrawal limits correction, 
according to actual water situation. 
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4.2. Based on actual water situation, ICWC permits to BWOs to make on-line water-
withdrawal corrections within the established limits, with notification of ICWC members. 
4.3. ICWC considers and approves activity program of ICWC and its executive bodies 
(plans of financing, capital investments, research, development and metrology, training 
activity and other costs), work programs for preparation of draft interstate agreements, 
international cooperation, for improvement of ICWC and its executive bodies, performs 
control over work, financing and economic activities of executive bodies. 
4.4. Decisions made by ICWC regarding regulation, use and protection of shared water 
are obligatory for all water consumers and users, irrespective of their citizenship or 
affiliation and ownership form. 
4.5. The members ensure execution of ICWC’s decisions on territories of their respective 
states. 
4.6. Leaders, officials and staff of ICWC executive bodies, who have business trips to 
State-Founders, can enter, leave and stay without visas on territories of these states no 
more than 30 days provided that they have national passports, service certificates in form 
approved by the Parties, and travel authorization. 
 
V. Executive bodies 
5.1. ICWC executive bodies include: 
● Secretariat; 
● Basin water organization “Amudarya” (BWO “Amudarya”); 
● Basin water organization “Syrdarya” (BWO “Syrdarya”); 
● Scientific Information Center for water related problems (SIC) and its national 
branches; 
● Coordination Metrological Center (CMC) and national organizations; 
● Training Center (TC) and its branches. 
5.2. ICWC may establish work groups for a certain period of time, with involvement of 
other economic sectors, to solve individual thematic tasks. 
5.3. ICWC Secretariat together with other executive bodies prepared agenda, measures 
and draft decision for ICWC meetings and performs control over execution of ICWC 
decisions and receipt of funds from State-Founders for financing of ICWC executive 
bodies. 
5.4. BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya” operate intake structures, waterworks 
facilities, reservoirs and other interstate structures that are transferred to BWO’s 
responsibilities for temporal operation, make estimates of water use in shared sources, 
make proposals for setting water-withdrawal limits, depending on water availability in 
sources for a planned period and ensure delivery of ICWC-set water limits in order to 
supply with water economic sectors, population and environment in State-Founders. 
5.5. On annual basis, BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya” prepare agreed proposals 
on water releases for nature, Aral Sea and on sanitary releases along canals that should 
not be used for other purposes. The heads of BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya” 
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bear personal responsibility for execution of ICWC-set releases to the Aral Sea within the 
zones of BWO jurisdictions. 
5.6. SIC ICWC together with its branches prepares draft decisions and programs on 
prospective development and implementation of a common regional water policy, on 
improvement of shared water use and management, common water conservation 
program, on environmental improvement in the basin, rationale and creation of 
automated water management systems in river basins, on creation and operation of 
common regional, basin and national information systems on water and land use; 
develops draft interstate agreement on shared water management in the Aral Sea basin; 
analyses water situation in the region and in the world and prepares proposals; upon 
agreement with ICWC cooperates with international donors and funding agencies; 
initiates and upon agreement with ICWC coordinates regional project implementation; 
organizes and provides training activity; organizes and stuffs reference-information fund, 
prepares and issues periodical and non-periodical publications. SIC ICWC undertakes 
publishing activity by authority of ICWC. 
5.7. CMC ICWC together with national metrological organizations coordinates 
technological policy and its implementation in area of metrological provision of ICWC 
programs and decisions on water use, protection and accounting in sources and water 
systems; organizes joint preparation and use in practice of normative-technical basis of 
metrological provision for water measurement, conducts integrated policy on water 
accounting, measurement technologies, automation devices and facilities developed and 
applied in water sector; organizes and performs work on accreditation, certification and 
training in area of hydrometry. 
5.8. TC ICWC together with its branches trains national water sectors’ higher and 
medium level staff through training workshops on IWRM, national and international 
water laws, irrigated agriculture and nature management improvement, etc. and ensures 
equal representation of the region’s countries, prepares and publishes essential 
courseware. 
5.9. ICWC executive bodies are legal entities having their independent balances, stamps 
with their titles in Russian and English, budget, settlement and other accounts. They act 
according to Regulations (Statues) approved by ICWC. 
5.10. The executive bodies may represent ICWC only after agreement by all ICWC 
members. 
5.11. Financing of ICWC executive bodies is made by the State-Founders: 
● for upkeep of personnel and basic operations of an executive body; moreover, the 
costs are shared proportionally to water withdrawals from interstate sources, with 
obligatory consideration of all efforts made by the executive body on the territory 
of given state; 
● for research, development and metrological work – on the basis of ICWC-
approved plan of this work, by each national water department of State-Founder 
according to territorial affiliation, towards assignments to IFAS; 
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● financing of Secretariat’s activities is made by ICWC State-Founder, which hosts 
the Secretariat, towards assignments to IFAS; 
● financing of SIC ICWC’ national branch is made by the State-Founder, which 
hosts given branch, towards assignments to IFAS. 
5.12. The property of ICWC executive bodies (real estate, cars, machinery, equipment 
and other material and technical values) is not subjected to privatization. Renting is made 
only upon permission of ICWC. 
 
VI. Order of rotation of the executive bodies and their heads 
6.1. The heads of ICWC executive bodies are appointed, with determined term of office 
and rotation order, and dismissed by ICWC decision. 
Location of executive bodies and their redislocation (rotation) are determined by ICWC 
decision. 
6.2. Rotation of ICWC executive bodies is made according to the Provision about order 
of rotation of executive bodies of the Interstate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC) 
and their heads. 
 
VII. Order of Statute change or activity cessation 
7.1. The Statute of ICWC is reviewed and adopted at ICWC meeting. Changes and 
amendment to the Statute are inserted in the same way. 
7.2. ICWC ceases its activity according to decision of the Heads of State-Founder. 
7.3. If ICWC ceases its activity, the property and jointly created assets, as well as 
structures transmitted to BWOs for temporal operation will be transferred to State-
Founders based on their belonging and according to established order of their creation. 
7.4. This Statute enters into force since the date of its signature. 
Done in the city of Almaty on 18th of September in 2008. 
For the Republic of Kazakhstan A. Ryabtsev 
For the Kyrghiz Republic B. Koshmatov 
For the Republic of Tadjikistan S. Yokubzod 
For Turkmenistan K. Ataliyev 
For the Republic of Uzbekistan Sh. Khamrayev 
 
Accessed at: http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm 
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The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan hereinafter referred to as "the Parties", 
● guided by the need for coordinated and organized solution of issues related to 
joint management of interstate water resources and for further pursuing 
coordinated policy in the interests of economic growth and raising living 
standards; 
● based on the historical community of people living in the republics, their equal 
rights and responsibilities for ensuring rational use and protection of water 
resources; 
● recognizing interdependence and interconnection of interests of all the republics 
in dealing with joint use of water resources according to the principles common 
for the entire region and equitable regulation of their use; 
● considering that only integration and joint coordination of actions will enable 
favorable conditions to deal with socio-economic problems, mitigate and stabilize 
ecological stress, which originated as a consequence of water resources 
exhaustion, as well as taking into account that there is imbalance in irrigated land 
availability per capita in the Republic of Tajikistan, and recognizing potential 
increase of water supply for irrigated agriculture, 
● respecting established structure and principles of water allocation and relying on 
regulatory documents on allocation of water resources from interstate sources 
currently in force; 
● have agreed upon the following: 
 
Article 1 
While recognizing community and integrity of water resources in the region, the Parties 
shall have equal rights to water use and responsibility to ensure rational use and 
protection of water. 
Article 2 
The Parties shall ensure that the agreed procedure and established rules for water use and 
protection are strictly observed. 
Article 3 
Each Party to the Agreement shall refrain from actions on their respective territories that 
might affect interests of other contracting Parties and cause them harm, lead to deviation 
from agreed volumes of water discharges and pollution of water sources. 
Article 4 
The Parties shall work together to address environmental problems resulted from drying 
up of the Aral Sea and set amounts of sanitary water releases for every given year in view 
of water content in interstate sources. 
In case of extremely dry years, a special separate decision shall be made to supply water 
for areas experiencing severe water scarcity. 
Article 5 
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The Parties will facilitate wide information exchange on scientific and technological 
advances in the field of water management, integrated use and protection of water 
resources [as well as promote] joint research to provide scientific and technological 
inputs and expert appraisals of project plans of water management facilities and 
economic assets. 
Article 6 
The Parties agree on joint use of productive potential of the republics’ water economy. 
Article 7 
The Parties decided to establish on a parity basis Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination to deal with the issues related to regulation, rational use and protection of 
water resources from interstate sources, which would be comprised of the heads of water 
agencies to meet quarterly and as the occasion requires - on the Parties’ initiative. 
The Commission’s meetings are held by turns under the chairmanship of the host 
country’s representative in the capital of this country. 
Article 8 
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination is authorized to: 
● determine water policy in the region, elaborate its key directions taking into 
account all economic branches needs, integrated and rational use of water 
resources, and long-term regional water supply program and measures for its 
implementation; 
● elaborate and approve annually water consumption quotas for each republic and 
the region as a whole, schedules for reservoir operation regimes, their correction 
according to revised forecasts, depending on actual flow probability and water-
economic situation. 
Article 9 
The executive and interministerial control bodies of the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination are Basin Water Organizations "Syrdarya" and "Amudarya", which must 
function under conditions that all structures along the rivers and water sources operated 
by these organizations are the property of the republics and provisionally transferred [to 
BWOs] without the right of disposal and redemption as of 1.01.1992. 
The Basin Water Organizations are financed through allocation of national water 
agencies on parity and shared basis. 
Article 10 
The Commission and its executive bodies shall ensure that: 
● water releases regime and water use quotas are strictly observed; 
● measures for rational water use and conservation, sanitary water releases along 
the river channels and through irrigation systems (where appropriate), and 
guaranteed water supply to river deltas and the Aral Sea with a view of 
environmental enhancement and water quality maintenance, according to 
achieved agreements, are implemented. 
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Article 11 
Decisions taken by the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination regarding 
compliance with established water withdrawal quotas, rational water use and protection 
are mandatory for all water consumers and users. 
Article 12 
The Parties agreed to elaborate within 1992 a mechanism of economic and other liability 
for violation of the agreed water use regime and quotas. 
Article 13 
All disputes shall be settled by the heads of national water agencies, with involvement of 
third party, if necessary. 
Article 14 
This Agreement can be amended or supplemented only through collective discussion by 
all the Parties to the Agreement. 
Article 15 
This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signing. 
The Agreement is signed in Alma-Ata on the 18th of February 1992. 
For the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Kipshakbayev 
For the Kyrgyz Republic M.Zulpuyev 
For the Republic of Tajikistan A.Nurov 
For Turkmenistan A.Ilamanov 
For the Republic of Uzbekistan R.Giniyatullin 
Accessed at: http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute1.htm  
 
